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Summary 
This thesis has been carried out in the industrial environment external to the 
University, as an industrial PhD. The results of this PhD have been tested, validated, 
and implemented in the production environment of Caixabank and have been used as 
models for others who have followed the same ideas. 
The most burning threats against banks throughout the Internet environment are 
based on software tools developed by criminal groups, applications running on web 
environment either on the computer of the victim (Malware) or on their mobile 
device itself through downloading rogue applications (fake app’s with Malware 
APP). 
Method of the thesis has been used is an approximation of qualitative exploratory 
research on the problem, the answer to this problem and the use of preventive 
methods to this problem like used authentication systems. 
This method is based on samples, events, surveys, laboratory tests, experiments, 
proof of concept; ultimately actual data that has been able to deduce the thesis 
proposal, using both laboratory research and grounded theory methods of data pilot 
experiments conducted in real environments. 
 
I've been researching the various aspects related to e-crime following a line of 
research focusing on intrinsically related topics:  
 The methods, means and systems of attack: Malware, Malware families of 
banker Trojans, Malware cases of use, Zeus as case of use. 
  The fixed platforms, mobile applications and as a means for malware attacks. 
 forensic methods to analyze the malware and infrastructure attacks. 
 Continuous improvement of methods of authentication of customers and users 
as a first line of defense anti- malware. 
 Using biometrics as innovative factor authentication. 
 
The line investigating Malware and attack systems intrinsically is closed related to 
authentication methods and systems to infect customer (executables, APP's, etc.), 
because the main purpose of malware is precisely steal data entered in the "logon 
"authentication system, to operate and thus, fraudulently, steal money from online 
banking customers.  
Experiments in the Malware allowed establishing a new method of decryption 
establishing guidelines to combat its effects describing his fraudulent scheme and 
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operation infection.  
I propose a general methodology to break the encryption communications malware 
(keystream), extracting the system used to encrypt such communications and a 
general approach of the Keystream technique. 
We show that this methodology can be used to respond to the threat of Zeus and 
finally provide lessons learned highlighting some general principles of Malware (in 
general) and in particular proposing Zeus Cronus, an IDS that specifically seeks the 
Zeus malware, testing it experimentally in a network production and providing an 
effective skills to combat the Malware are discussed. 
The thesis is a research interrelated progressive evolution between malware infection 
systems and authentication methods, reflected in the research work cumulatively, 
showing an evolution of research output and looking for a progressive improvement 
of methods authentication and recommendations for prevention and preventing 
infections, a review of the main app stores for mobile financial services and a 
proposal to these stores 
The most common methods eIDAMS (authentication methods and electronic 
identification) implemented in Europe and its robustness are analyzed.  An analysis 
of adequacy is presented in terms of efficiency, usability, costs, types of operations 
and segments including possibilities of use as authentication method with biometrics 
as innovation. 
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Resumen 
Este trabajo de tesis se ha realizado en el entorno industrial externo a la Universidad 
como un PhD industrial Los resultados de este PhD han sido testeados, validados, e 
implementados en el entorno de producción de Caixabank y han sido utilizados como 
modelos por otras que han seguido las mismas ideas. 
Las amenazas más candentes contra los bancos en todo el entorno Internet, se basan en 
herramientas software desarrolladas por los grupos delincuentes, aplicaciones que se 
ejecutan tanto en entornos web ya sea en el propio ordenador de la víctima (Malware) 
o en sus dispositivos móviles mediante la descarga de falsas aplicaciones (APP falsa 
con Malware). 
Como método se ha utilizado una aproximación de investigación exploratoria 
cualitativa sobre el problema, la respuesta a este problema y el uso de métodos 
preventivos a este problema a través de la autenticación.  
Este método se ha basado en muestras, hechos, encuestas, pruebas de laboratorio, 
experimentos, pruebas de concepto; en definitiva datos reales de los que se ha podido 
deducir la tesis propuesta, utilizando tanto investigación de laboratorio como métodos 
de teoría fundamentada en datos de experimentos pilotos realizados en entornos reales. 
He estado investigando los diversos aspectos relacionados con e-crime siguiendo una 
línea de investigación focalizada en temas intrínsecamente relacionadas: 
 Los métodos, medios y sistemas de ataque: Malware, familias de Malware de 
troyanos bancarios, casos de usos de Malware, Zeus como caso de uso. 
 Las plataformas fijas, los móviles y sus aplicaciones como medio para realizar 
los ataques de Malware. 
 Métodos forenses para analizar el Malware y su infraestructura de ataque. 
 Mejora continuada de los métodos de autenticación de los clientes y usuarios 
como primera barrera de defensa anti- malware. 
 Uso de la biometría como factor de autenticación innovador. 
La línea investiga el Malware y sus sistemas de ataque intrínsecamente relacionada 
con los métodos de autenticación y los sistemas para infectar al cliente (ejecutables, 
APP’s, etc.) porque el objetivo principal del malware es robar precisamente los datos 
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que se introducen en el “logon” del sistema de autenticación para operar de forma 
fraudulenta y sustraer así el dinero de los clientes de banca electrónica.  
Los experimentos realizados en el Malware permitieron establecer un método 
novedoso de descifrado que estableció pautas para combatir sus efectos fraudulentos 
describiendo su esquema de infección y funcionamiento  
Propongo una metodología general para romper el cifrado de comunicaciones del 
malware (keystream) extrayendo el sistema utilizado para cifrar dichas 
comunicaciones y una generalización de la técnica de Keystream. 
Se demuestra que esta metodología puede usarse para responder a la amenaza de 
Zeus y finalmente proveemos lecciones aprendidas resaltando algunos principios 
generales del Malware (en general) y Zeus en particular proponiendo Cronus, un IDS 
que persigue específicamente el Malware Zeus, probándolo experimentalmente en 
una red de producción y se discuten sus habilidades y efectividad.  
En la tesis hay una evolución investigativa progresiva interrelacionada entre el 
Malware, sistemas de infección y los métodos de autenticación, que se refleja en los 
trabajos de investigación de manera acumulativa,  mostrando una evolución del 
output de investigación y buscando una mejora progresiva de los métodos de 
autenticación y de la prevención y recomendaciones para evitar las infecciones, una 
revisión de las principales tiendas de Apps para servicios financieros para móviles y 
una propuesta para estas tiendas  
Se analizan los métodos más comunes eIDAMS (Métodos de Autenticación e 
Identificación electrónica) implementados en Europa y su robustez y presentamos un 
análisis de adecuación en función de eficiencia, usabilidad, costes, tipos de operación 
y segmentos incluyendo un análisis de posibilidades con métodos biométricos como 
innovación.  
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Resum 
Aquest treball de tesis s’ha realitzat en l’entorn industrial extern a la Universitat com 
un PhD industrial en l’entorn financer de Caixabank. Els resultats d’aquests PhD han 
sigut testejats, validats e implementats en l’entorn de producció d’aquesta institució 
financera i han sigut utilitzats per altres que han seguit les mateixes idees. 
Les amenaces més candents contra els bancs a tot l'entorn Internet, es basen en eines 
programari desenvolupades pels grups delinqüents, aplicacions que s'executen tant en 
entorns web ja sigui en el propi ordinador de la víctima (Malware) o en els seus 
dispositius mòbils mitjançant la descàrrega de falses aplicacions (APP falsa amb 
Malware). 
Com a mètode s'ha utilitzat una aproximació d'investigació exploratòria qualitativa 
sobre el problema, la resposta a aquest problema i l'ús de mètodes preventius a aquest 
problema a través de l'autenticació. 
Aquest mètode s'ha basat en mostres, fets, enquestes, proves de laboratori, 
experiments, proves de concepte; en definitiva dades reals dels que s'ha pogut deduir 
la tesi proposada, utilitzant tant investigació de laboratori com a mètodes de teoria 
fonamentada en dades d'experiments pilots realitzats en entorns reals. 
He estat investigant els diversos aspectes relacionats amb e-crime seguint una línia 
d'investigació focalitzada en temes intrínsecament relacionades: 
 Els mètodes, mitjans i sistemes d'atac: Malware, famílies de Malware de troians 
bancaris, casos d'usos de Malware, Zeus com a cas d'ús. 
 Les plataformes fixes, els mòbils i les seves aplicacions com a mitjà per a 
realitzar els atacs de Malware. 
 Mètodes forenses per analitzar el Malware i la seva infraestructura d'atac. 
 Millora continuada dels mètodes d'autenticació dels clients i usuaris com a 
primera barrera de defensa anti malware. 
 Ús de la biometria com a factor d'autenticació innovador. 
La línia investiga el Malware i els seus sistemes d'atac intrínsecament relacionada amb 
els mètodes d'autenticació i els sistemes per infectar al client (executables, APP s, etc.) 
perquè l'objectiu principal del Malware és robar precisament les dades que 
s'introdueixen en el "logon "del sistema d'autenticació per operar de manera 
fraudulenta i sostreure així els diners dels clients de banca electrònica. 
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Els experiments realitzats en el Malware van permetre establir un mètode nou de 
desxifrat que va establir pautes per combatre els seus efectes fraudulents descrivint el 
seu esquema d'infecció i funcionament 
Proposo una metodologia general per trencar el xifrat de comunicacions del Malware 
(keystream) extraient el sistema utilitzat per xifrar les comunicacions i una 
generalització de la tècnica de keystream. 
Es demostra que aquesta metodologia pot fer-se servir per respondre a l'amenaça de 
Zeus i finalment proveïm lliçons apreses ressaltant alguns principis generals del 
Malware (en general) i Zeus en particular proposant Cronus, un IDS que persegueix 
específicament el Malware Zeus, provant-ho experimentalment en una xarxa de 
producció i es discuteixen les seves habilitats i efectivitat. 
A la tesi hi ha una evolució investigativa progressiva interrelacionada entre el 
Malware, sistemes d'infecció i els mètodes d'autenticació, que es reflecteix en els 
treballs d'investigació de manera acumulativa, mostrant una evolució de l'output de 
recerca i buscant una millora progressiva dels mètodes de autenticació i de la 
prevenció i recomanacions per evitar les infeccions, una revisió de les principals 
botigues d'Apps per a serveis financers per a mòbils i una proposta per a aquestes 
botigues 
S'analitzen els mètodes més comuns eIDAMS (Mètodes d'autenticació i identificació 
electrònica) implementats a Europa i la seva robustesa i vam presentar una anàlisi 
d'adequació en funció d'eficiència, usabilitat, costos, tipus d'operació i segments 
incloent una anàlisi de possibilitats amb mètodes biomètrics com innovació. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Online financial services (online banking) allow substantial cost reduction (over 50%) 
in banking. With the birth of the Internet, the financial sector soon identified a 
business opportunity and a chance to reduce operating costs in the use of web pages 
and portals as a commercial channel. The network of commercial Internet began to 
expand in 1990, and the financial sector was quick to create the first web pages in that 
decade. 
For two decades, parallel to the development of online banking sector, the criminal 
world on the Internet was developed (e-crime, by its Anglo-Saxon name). This group 
of criminals needed no scientific explanation, it was just easier to try stealing money 
online, than wielding a pistol in a conventional robbery. 
 
The organized crime groups were soon interested in this medium as a low-risk way to 
make money and quick profits. Today many organized crime groups operating from 
across the world with the aim of stealing money from customers in the financial 
sector. 
 
Platforms through customers connect to online banking bank have been developed in 
parallel with the Internet and communication skills and protocols evolution. Therefore 
the methods of client authentication when using bank services are crucial to prevent 
fraud. Due to this fact authentication systems and technical systems and procedures 
used to commit fraud and steal money (malware, social engineering, etc.) are and will 
be closely related. 
 
The evolution of the first data transport protocols TCP and IP internet protocols, the 
hardware platforms, And the software made possible the evolution of personal 
computers and mobile platforms, and this led to a gradual change on the modalities 
used by the industry e-crime attackers, which have increased, modified, transformed 
and evolved their systems of attack as the hardware and software developments 
opened up new possibilities. 
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The first attacks were directed to communications networks and systems, the evolution 
have given attackers to the platform (PC) of the final user –the customer-, who is - by 
excellence- the weakest link in the chain because of its little technical knowledge of 
computer security. Attacks to users rely on social engineering routing them to become 
infected with malware, to fake websites (phishing) or false applications (executables, 
APP's with malicious content) than with the art of deception download malware to 
their working platforms fixed or mobile (computers, tablets, “smartphones”, etc.). 
 
The financial and payment media sector is one of the critical infrastructures most 
affected by fraud through electronic channels and new technologies. The challenges 
for the defense systems of companies and institutions in the public and private sectors 
and even governments are colossal. 
 
Attacks against banks throughout the Internet environment threats are based on 
software tools developed by criminal groups, applications running on web 
environments, either in the computer of the victim (malware) or by using different 
social engineering ploys to lure potential victims to a fake website (Phishing), or on 
their mobile devices by downloading rogue applications (false APP), the Malware in 
all is the application star, due to its effectiveness and ease camouflage. 
 
What in the seventies was a matter of a few with advanced technological knowledge, 
became a "comodity", actually it’s nowadays possible the purchase of a kit or specific 
Phishing Malware for the banking sector (a Trojan), designed to steal credentials 
banking customers at an affordable price. ($ 40 per day, or $ 450 for a month is 
available a phishing kit; $ 1,200 for a highly sophisticated Trojan kit, or $ 800 to $ 
4000 by Zeus toolkit basic Trojan, or $ 100,000 to $ 6,000 by one with the source 
code, according to rumors, [31] code). 
 
Objectives Assets are monetary client funds, the reputation of the bank and the 
confidence that customers have in their bank, and by extension, the identity of the 
customer which, in order to perpetrate attacks, is necessary to replace in many cases. 
The reputation of the electronic channel as a means for banks is also crucial. The loss 
of reputation as a channel could end the online banking business. 
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The methods of attack have been becoming more sophisticated; from crude initial 
methods increasingly towards sophisticated attacks. Methods are passing through the 
boom of the phishing Phishing, the current boom of Malware, the APP's fraudulent, 
targeted attacks and attacks on cloud systems. Attacks are increasing their diversity 
and sophistication to levels that require high technical knowledge on the part of its 
developers. Each attack is determined to overcome in one way or another 
authentication systems used by banks to their customers to operate. 
 
Phishing is a method of attack using social engineering (The Art of Deception) to steal 
login credentials to bank customers. The most basic method is to send thousands of 
emails by methods of spam (sending mass mailings), supplanting the Web identity of 
the bank by some ruse (use of logos and signs of identity) and false message to induce 
customers to the bank fake page to hand over their credentials. 
 
After obtaining the key the attacker logon on the bench (like legitimate client) and 
makes transfers to accounts allies (Mules), collaborating in voluntary or also deceived 
by the same social engineering. The phishing attack methods are diversified from the 
initial attacks in which keys are requested by the sending e-mail.to more sophisticated 
methods such as rock phishing (involves multiple domains), the fast-flux phishing 
(multiple IP), smsphising (sms), spearphishing (phishing proximity or trust), etc. All 
of them designed to hinder the "take down" - suspension – of the fraudulent pages. 
 
Hence the more sophisticated authentication methods are, the harder it will be to carry 
out the deception. 
We understand for authentication- authentication method or authentification- the act of 
establishing or confirming something (or someone) as authentic. The process of 
attempting to verify the digital identity of the sender of a communication as a request 
to connect to the legitimate website of the bank, is also authentication.  
 
On the website of the bank trustily authentication is a way to ensure that users are who 
they say they are and therefore authorized users. 
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The criminals go where the money is. The use of highly sophisticated Malware 
represents one of the most harmful threats to this sector. Some of the financial 
institutions that conduct research play an important role in detection and in 
implementing countermeasures to protect their customers. 
 
One of the biggest threats comes from malware purposely developed to perform fraud 
in banking systems. The banking Malware (Trojan) is a code that is installed on the 
user's computer using standard techniques of computer viruses, for capturing data 
exchanged by the user in his day operation and his bank, including information of 
authentication and user operation  
 
The most basic are the "keyloggers" that collect, record, read the user's keystrokes or 
capture images even displayed on the screen when the user operates the banking 
website. Malicious code continues specializing. Banker Trojans are customized 
specifically for banks changing the look of your real website, by superimposing a fake 
window when the user accesses the online service of your bank. The overlay 
simulates, in part or in full, to the legitimate website so that the user enters information 
authentication codes in it, believing that it does in the real. 
 
The methods of attack by malware evolve significantly from simple “keyloggers” and 
defenses authentication methods consisting of simple things like putting a virtual 
keyboard. To new malware that could quickly perform many more tasks to achieve its 
objective of removing credentials and send the attacker, to the actual much more 
elaborated banking Trojans that allowed steal credentials using concealment methods, 
modifying the operating system and shipping credentials during operations etc. To end 
as the middleman methods ("Man in the middle") that currently is a sophisticated 
attack in which the attacker (through its Malware) acquires the ability to read, insert 
and modify transactions between the bank and its customer without any of the two 
sides know that the link between them has been violated, or the "Man in the Browser" 
which is a type of attack using malware (trojan), after infecting a machine that is 
capable of modifying pages websites, content or transactions, in an invisible way for 
both the user and the bank server. 
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In the financial sector we need to quickly detect, understand its mechanisms, and 
neutralize its infrastructure to prevent fraud consumer, prevent money laundering and 
protect customers from Trojans. 
 
Also affected platforms have evolved from networks, workstations and personal 
computers, to be any mobile phones, smartphones, tablets, iPods, ipads, iphones, etc. 
currently affected by new generation Trojans. 
 
There are several research groups both in educational institutions and in the private 
sector. The first publications on security in the e-crime sector talk were about security 
on computers, networks and applications. Later mainly due to the development of 
smart phones publications on security in mobile applications and APP's appear. 
 
 
1.1 Environment conducting the research 
This PhD work has been performed in an environment outside the University, like an 
industrial PhD. The hosting and funding organization has been CaixaBank, one of the 
leading financial institutions in EU and Spain. The results of this PhD work have been 
tested, validated and implemented in the productive environment of that financial 
institution, and others have followed the same ideas. 
"La Caixa" suffered the first phishing attack at the beginning of 2005 and as a defense 
for future attacks, after this first break up, I established a group of incident response. 
e-LC CSIRT. (E-Lacaixa Computer Security Incident Response Team). It was in this 
environment in which it became clear the need to develop a parallel field of research 
that allow us to understand better, systems, schemes, utilities, tools and processes 
related to crime on the Internet (e-crime). The need to investigate the strengthening of 
our defense systems arise same time; the client authentication methods to which these 
attacks are directed. 
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The first malware attack was a "0 day". A virus that had no reference in the wild arise 
and attacked the bank and the industry a few months later. We got a sample of this 
attacker malware at the home of a client, we performed forensic analysis, we realized 
how it works and we get dismantle their infrastructure. Subsequently delivered to 
antivirus firms worldwide vaccine was manufactured. The virus was baptized with the 
name "Anserin". 
 
To effectively counter mesure these threats it became apparent the need for a thorough 
understanding of the operation of banking malware. To stop it I’ve created an internal 
research group in the CSIRT (Computer Security Incident Response Team), focused 
solely on research of various aspects of the viruses, Trojans, forensics, incident 
response systems for Malware and investigate the authentication means to counter 
them. 
 
This group established national and international contacts. Cooperation in universities 
and other relevant research sought worldwide; These include Carnegie Mellon 
University, Polytechnic University of Catalonia, Universitat Ramon Llull, Trinity 
College Dublin, Southern Methodist University, Baylor University, SEI (Software 
Engineering Institute in Pittsburgh), University of Alabama at Birmingham, SANS 
Institute, etc. 
 
The same year the CSIRT became a member of FIRST (Forum of Incident Response 
& Security Teams) and in front of APWG (Anti-Phishing Working Group). At FIRST 
I spent three years on the Board of Directors and currently I’ am a member of the 
Board of Directors and the Steering Committee of APWG, Inc. and founder and patron 
APWG.eu. 
 
Subsequently various alliances with other research groups, UDC (University of 
Dublin), FBD (Barcelona Digital Foundation) and the interests of Research and 
Development from BDigital and CSIRT converged and new alliances were made, 
expanding the research group for issues of e-crime. 
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It is in the context of defending the interests of clients in the financial sector and the 
entity itself deeply concerned for the safety of banking online and the effect on the 
reputation of this business, where I started several investigations, directed by me, with 
the participation of people in my team, in collaboration with renowned research 
estates, always related to the world "e-crime", in order to figure out the various aspects 
of the criminal underworld of Internet, related Malware banking and barriers that must 
overcome these applications: the authentication systems. 
 
 
1.2 Vision 
The aim is not just pure research itself, if not applied research to medium or long term, 
or even conduct the banking sector to a better understanding about how this criminal 
underworld works and help this sector to improve, prevent and counteract 
consequences of the activities of the criminals having focused their activities in this 
direction. 
I've been researching the various aspects related to e-crime following a line of research 
focusing on intrinsically related topics: 
• The methods, means and systems of attack: Malware, Malware families of banker 
Trojans, Malware as case of use, Zeus as case of use. 
• The fixed platforms, the mobile applications used and as a means for malware 
attacks. 
• forensic methods used to analyze the malware and infrastructure attacks. 
Continuous improving of authentication methods implemented to ensure customers 
and users as a first line of defense anti- malware used by banks. 
The utilization of biometric system implemented as innovative factor authentication. 
We conducted various researches on malware in general, the various families of 
malware (Trojans) that attack the institutions of the banking sector and the means of 
defense against this system of attack by malware. Also these and other attacks occur 
with the involvement of the use of social engineering against authentication methods, 
which is the reason why the use and development of these methods are vital for 
security professionals in the banking sector. 
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Within this framework, my thesis studies the banking malware in general and families 
of malware (ZEUS) as case of use, and authentication systems in production in major 
European companies facing this malware and the use of biometrics as an 
authentication method for online banking as a case of use. 
 
 
1.3 Motivation: questions the thesis should investigate. 
 
1.3.1 Motivation & reason 1 
General financial malware research topic: How the Financial malware work? What 
platforms and electronic environments attack? How to carry out their attacks? How 
does the Zeus malware family attacks, How we can detect it, analyze it from the point 
of forensic view and how we can design tools to neutralize the threat posed to 
customers of the banking sector? What platforms, electronic environments, 
applications it attack (phones, computers, "tablets", etc.)? 
 
1.3.2 Motivation & reason 2 
Malware affecting banking: What mechanisms, products, systems can be used to 
neutralize it? We propose "Cronus" IDS specifically fighting Zeus. What we give as 
recommendations to prevent attacks in fixed, mobile platforms? What role does apps, 
mobile applications? What recommendations we can provide against Malware. 
 
1.3.3 Motivation & reason 3 
Current methods of authentication: What are the methods used by professionals? What 
are the reasons for use? What segments? what parameters are used? Use reasons: 
robustness, usability, efficiency, etc.? 
 
1.3.4 Motivation & reason 4 
Secure authentication: What we can recommend as more secure authentication 
methods depending on market segments-customers, electronic platforms (phones, 
computers, tablets, etc.), to counter attacks by Trojans and other methods? Do we have 
to use of biometrics as anti-Malware barrier? 
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1.4 Objectives of the thesis. With the work done in this thesis is pursued: 
1.4.1 Objective 1: 
Understand the functioning of financial Malware families Malware finance, the Zeus 
Trojan family as a case of use study and example of other future financial malware 
families. 
 
1.4.2 Objective 2: 
Give a set of recommendations and a tool to become more effective combating 
malware in both fixed and mobile platforms. Make recommendations to neutralize 
attacks on mobile platforms and the Apps. 
 
1.4.3 Objective 3: 
Analyze authentication systems of banks. Propose alternatives. Study the use of 
biometric authentication methods. 
 
1.4.4 Objective 4: 
Give a series of recommendations to make the system more effective attacks against 
malware using authentication methods Analysing "eFraud" including different 
families of malware, including methods of attack and their barriers we built trough the 
authentication methods. 
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2. RELATED WORK. “STATE OF THE ART” 
 
There are several forums where different authors conduct research scientific 
publications in this field. 
There are also private associations whose goals include research in the field e-crime; 
- APWG (Anti-Phishing Working Group) 
- FIRST (Global Forum of Incident Response and Security teams) 
- Mobey Forum, 
- MAAWG (Message Anti-Abuse Working Group) 
- Cloud Security Alliance, 
- ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assignment Names and Numbers), etc. 
 
The bibliography reflects the problems of safer use of the Internet since the beginning 
of the commercial use of financial services such as interaction channel between the 
client and the bank. 
The literature review of the issues presented in the thesis reflects the various vectors of 
research. 
Regarding the research work carried out concerning the problem posed by malware; in 
recent years financial malware and fraudulent activities have been studied in various 
aspects. Chandrasekaran et al. [1] propose an approach for detecting phishing attacks 
using false responses and monitoring the behavior. Birk and Gajek [2] extended a 
framework that uses "honeytokens" [3] to track phishers. Technology-based strategies 
have been developed to analyze botnets and disable dynamically. Holz et al. [4] they 
introduced a methodology to track and observe botnets using "honeypots". Inspired by 
the work of Holtz, "The Dorothy Framework" [5] was developed with the intention to 
track and display a botnet automatically. This research framework was customized [6] 
to investigate botnets oriented to financial sector. "Comand and Controls" (C & C) - - 
In modern malware routine encrypted to encrypt their traffic to communicate with its 
control systems are used is necessary to remove the symmetric key communication 
Binary Malware to succeed in deciphering flow communication. For this purpose, 
Caballero et al. [7] proposed a tool that takes advantage of the binary code to extract 
fragments of code encryption / decryption and reused to discover malicious traffic. 
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Leader et al. [8] [9] came to the same objective monitoring data exchange malware to 
level I / O interfaces of the sandbox. 
 
Alongside the research efforts in analysis and detection of malware they have 
conducted research on countermeasures to counter the threat. Blocking IP to DNS has 
been investigated frequently [10] [11] [12] to prevent communication of those infected 
with the C & C with different modalities that resolve to a non-accessible or blocked IP 
computers. On the other hand they have been used in the identification patterns IDS to 
identify and block malicious traffic from botnets [13] [14]. Omerod et al. [15] 
investigated kits botnets, reputational botnets to discourage or pursue to the end user 
of the stolen credentials. Ford and Gordon [16] focused their research on methods of 
income attacking malicious code to harm the economic model of criminals. Focusing 
on the case of use Zeus, Binsalleeh et al. published a comprehensive analysis of the 
1.2.4.2 version of the tool [16]. They did reverse engineering to discover its internal 
characteristics and to better understand their behavior to stop injecting false 
information to the C & C botnet and consequently damage the reputation of malware. 
In its publication they indicate that the communication between the infected host and 
Zeus C & C resides in a vulnerable implementation of RC4 encryption that can be 
exploited by an attack flow reuse keys. 
 
Our research in Malware expands their research into new techniques for deciphering 
Zeus findings. In "Taming Zeus by leveraging Its Own internals crypto" Our research 
is based on analysis of the communications flow behavior. Additionally, our work 
focuses on a new version of Zeus that has a higher level of complexity with respect to 
the publication specified. In Titans' revenge: Detecting Its Own Zeus via flaws 
"investigated the vulnerability given by authors [17] By focusing on the analysis of the 
host. This extensive work previous research results of Zeus, researching new 
techniques to detect and decode communications Zeus. Also Zeus version is newer 
than the previously published studies. Historically criminals go where the money is 
and the impact of malware attacks in the financial sector and its mode of operation can 
be seen clearly citing as examples the two high impact attacks carried out in 2012, the 
"High Roller incident" [ 18] that he got fraud 60 million Euros, and the "Eurograbber" 
which were stolen 36 million Euros in 30,000 banking customers [19]. In both attacks 
hackers managed to take control and authentication keys subtract, mocking systems 
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two-factor authentication and perform fraud. As a result, authentication systems 
continue magnetically attracting attention from research groups and professionals. 
 
Concerning the Malware and its relationship with the authentication methods used in 
banks in the European financial business sector, it considers that, as stated in the 
above examples, authentication systems play a key role in the successful execution of 
a malware attack and the weaker is an authentication system many more possibilities 
with the attackers to get the money, as well, considering that cyber criminals are 
increasingly organized and sophisticated in new technology groups must continually 
identify Emerging challenges associated with technological developments. 
In [20] authors discuss overall challenges and relevant aspects identified in e-banking. 
Other authors [21] [22] have presented an extensive study on e-banking security and 
introduce a formal definition of threats in e-banking and security models. In [23], the 
author presents a study on security threats through the proposed use of biometrics for 
strong authentication in e-banking scenarios. Taxonomy of attacks on authentication 
systems in e-banking is introduced by the authors in [24], further authentication 
solution based on "challenge / response" is proposed. An assessment methods 
authentication for e-banking by the authors proposed in [25], however the presented 
study focuses only on the PC environment. Authors in [26] analyzed the eIDAS 
systems used in major banks in English-speaking countries; the investigation is limited 
to data collection by observation (published data). Contrary to our approach, which 
analyzes these same factors eIDAS considering current e-banking with information 
provided by professional systems leading European banks? Finally our research 
provides advice on eIDAS and a set of recommendations that take into account the 
perspective of security professionals. 
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3. RESEARCH WORK CARRIED OUT & METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Organization and structure of the research 
 
The main results of this thesis are presented in chapters. As supplements to digest for 
the thesis we have presented research results at conferences (proceedings and 
presentations) and papers published by diverse editors. 
 
Method has been used is an approximation of qualitative exploratory research on the 
problem, the answer to this problem and the use of preventive methods to this problem 
through authentication. We achieved conclusions and recommendations. 
 
This research method needs no prior assumptions and has been used as a method in 
other publications. It is based on samples, events, surveys, laboratory testing, proof of 
concept, in short real data that has been able to deduce the thesis proposal, using both 
laboratory research methods based on information theory; survey data, data from 
experiments in controlled environments and data pilot experiments conducted in real 
environments. 
 
The thesis is the response to the question and the objectives we have settled at the 
beginning of the research. Through its chapters responds to the thesis problem and 
questions and gives tools, recommendations and solutions to it. At the same time gives 
a progressive evolution trough the research to the problem. 
 
The publications done during research are an evolution of the research with related 
topics. Malware investigating the line and attack systems intrinsically related to 
authentication methods and systems to infect customer (executables, APP's, etc.) 
because the main purpose of malware is precisely steal data entered in the "logon 
"authentication system to operate and thus fraudulently steal money from online 
banking customers. 
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That is why the tasks of the research are to investigate the malware in general, the 
most famous family of malware Zeus as use case, the APP's phones that include 
Malware and research tasks of authentication methods and the incorporation of 
biometrics in such methods as the case of use. 
 
In the line chosen there is an interrelated research gradual evolution from malware 
infected systems and authentication methods-methods anti Malware defense and 
prevention - which is reflected in the thesis work and its publication publications 
cumulatively, showing an evolution of research output and looking for a progressive 
improvement in the results of research on malware and improved authentication 
methods and prevention and recommendations to avoid infection. 
The thesis is organized in chapters focusing the problem of the hypothesis. Chapter 
one explains about malware analysis and solutions, chapter two explains about 
authentication methods and use as Malware solution, chapter three is about results and 
conclusions. Contributions to the research on the diverse aspects are largely 
commented trough the chapters. 
 
 
3.2 Malware. 
The reason why malware is chosen generically is because together with phishing are 
most concerning threats in the financial sector and more truble us as security 
professionals in the banking sector, with one notable difference. Phishing in all 
"visible" and the response to mitigate risk is easy to deduce, imagine and apply. By 
contrast in malware attack system is completely hidden in nature besides obfuscated 
on purpose, we must make a considerable effort to understand the intricacies of its 
operation before displaying even the first steps to mitigate them. It is here that play a 
crucial role authentication methods, investigated in the work. As more sophisticated 
they are more effective they are, but this fact is working against other aspects like 
usability. 
 
That is why in our first research on Malware was selected Zeus as a case of use, whose 
attack system, widespread in other banking Trojans and network with more or less 
sophistication in its different versions, was focused on getting the credentials of our e-
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banking customers, alongside the many systems and financial institutions in the world 
that have similar systems to ours consisting of a first level authentication ID and pin 
six positions for communicating with the bank and a second level with random 
coordinates card 60 positions. 
 
Why Zeus as use case? The reason is simple Zeus or Zbot, born for the first time in 
2006 at the hands of Russian cybercriminals is the world's most famous banking 
malware due to its sophisticated modus operandi. In July 2009, at its peak, a safety 
report Damballa [29] placed him number one ranking as the main threat among all 
Botnets, infecting 3.6 million computers in the US alone. 
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The work carried out so far has materialized in different approaches described in the 
first thesis chapter. Its evolution has conditioned our authentication systems in the 
wide range of the industry, fostering the change and evolution of the different 
authentication systems to face it and achieving in our case to add an OTP system, 
based in Challenge-response as final query to complete a transfer operation.  
During the thesis research, six main publications have been achieved and can be found 
in table that we include as a demonstration of the work achieved and as a 
dissemination method of our results through the scientific community worldwide 
working in similar topics. In addition, we add conference presentations specified in 
Tables 1 and 2.  
 
 
3.3 Methodology used to address the problem of Malware. 
 
3.3.1 Establishes the state of the art through the literature review. 
3.3.2 To understand how the infrastructures that support the Malware work we 
realized a previous work where we will study various botnets functioning 
3.3.3 To study the malware we will do the following experiment with the following: 
Samples  
3.3.3.1 Capture of samples in customers' computers infected by Malware banking. 
3.3.3.2 I have defined privacy policy and technical methodology in the capture of 
samples, validated the process of collecting them. A team of e-LC CSIRT is 
responsible for identifying customer contaminated equipment and extracting samples 
under my supervision. 
3.3.3.3 Install the samples in our laboratory machines that I get infected with malware 
(of the ZEUS family). If within the time frame set for the completion of the thesis new 
families of malware arised, and it is possible to get samples of malware that appear on 
the Internet, the experiment will be extended to the new samples and will follow the 
same pattern, although it may we should modify some aspect of flow analysis as 
forensic breakthrough phase. 
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3.3.3.4 I led the definition of the architecture used to analyze the malware systems and 
sources have identified where to get samples of malware and managed collaborative 
arrangements with providers of the same. Also under discussion with the team we 
have chosen the software platforms used for the experiment. 
3.3.3.4.1 Analyze malware traffic generated Keystream techniques. This analysis has 
made the team, under my supervision. 
2.3.3.4.2 Analyze the malware download files on the computer victim. This analysis 
has made the team, under my supervision. 
3.3.3.4.3 Forensic analysis and drawing conclusions from the analysis of the malware. 
Forensic testing has been performed by the task force, under my supervision. The 
conclusions are agreed in team meetings led by me. 
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i. I’ve been identifying methods to counteract the consequences of the attacks, through 
contacts with professionals and researchers in international forums, and 
ii. I’ve been making proposals for improving these methods, which constitute 
innovative contributions in cyber security in the financial sector. 
 
New mechanisms and new methodology to neutralize the malware is proposed. 
We implement proofs of concept. We recommend on how to combat malware through 
various systems and best practices derived from lessons learned from the analysis and 
publication of results of research work done. 
 
 
3.4 Methodology to address the issue of authentication systems  
 
3.4.1 Establish the state of the art through the literature review. 
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3.4.2 To address the research on authentication systems during 2013 conducted a 
survey directed to professionals in the banking sector in Europe; CISO's, CIO's, IT 
Managers security. This survey was launched through various forums with which I 
have contacts. APWG, FI-ISAC, ENISA, FIRST, etc. 
3.4.2.1 Development of the contact list. This task has been undertaken by my thanks to 
the contacts made in many years of work in international organizations in the security 
sector and positions held in the management bodies of FIRST, ICANN and APWG. 
3.4.2.2 "triage" of the topics of the survey. This task is done by the team with my 
direct participation and supervised by me. 
3.4.2.3 Development of survey questions. This task is done by the team with my direct 
participation and supervised by me. 
3.4.2.4 Release of the survey contacts. This task has been undertaken by ENISA and 
supervised by me. From the results obtained in the survey will do various jobs to 
consider which are the most commonly used authentication methods in European 
banking, reasons for use, segments which are implemented and to recommend its use. 
 
Page   30  
  
4. CHAPTER I: Malware 
4.1. The Zeus malware 
The Zeus malware (also 
known as Zbot) first 
appeared in 2006 when a 
security firm released a 
full reverse engineering 
analysis [27] about an 
unknown trojan named 
PRG. Since then, it has 
been modified and 
customized to suite 
specific needs and 
released in different 
variants, each one 
offering innovative 
features to steal sensitive 
information. Zeus was 
originally created, 
distributed, and 
maintained by Russian 
cybercrime gangs [28]. 
Historically, the russian 
cyber underground scene 
is mainly of criminal 
intent, as the ultimate 
goal would be to 
maximize the amount of 
money the participants could make. On top of that, the general hacking environment in 
Russia can be mainly characterized as financially driven. Controversially, legal 
persecution of cyber crime in Russia is not a priority. Strategically, Russian hackers 
usually avoid to target regular Russian citizens in order to gain a shared sense of 
toleration and even admiration. In addition, the strategic choice to prefer targets outside 
the Russian Federation complicates the cross-border cooperation that is needed to 
investigate the cybercrime related frauds. Indeed, investigating crimes against foreign 
interest does not represent a priority for law enforcement officers in Russia [28].  
Figure 1: Zeus TCP packet structure 1 
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4.1.1. The crimeware toolkit 
The Zeus crimeware toolkit used to be sold privately for a price that ranged between 
$800 and $4,000. However, its mar-ket value has been drastically reconsidered since 
the leakage of its source code on March 2011. Interestingly, on February 2011, a forum 
post was published on a notorious underground forum where a seller offered the full 
version of the Zeus source code (toolkit included) for a “high price”. Speculations 
suggest that the price asked by the seller was floating around $100,000 [31]. When the 
source code was leaked, it generated a spiky increase of new Zeus malware variants, 
offering to the entire Internet community a framework to easily set up a robust financial 
botnet for free. The builder offers the capability to create customized malware 
executables and the botnet configuration files needed for the correct botnet operation. 
In this way, users could create their own malware which targets the financial 
institutions that have been inserted in the malware building process. Additionally, the 
control panel offers the ability to easily ad-minister the botnet trough a user-friendly 
PHP page that allows the botnet owners to quickly retrieve a comprehensive status of 
their bots, and to be able to download the stolen information. Moreover, the installer 
comes with a bilingual manual (Russian and English) which explain the fundamental 
steps required to install the Zeus suite. 
The Zeus malware is software designed to make a profit also by its development. 
As a matter of fact, its full customizability offers to cyber-criminals the opportunity to 
develop new modules and sell them to the market place. For instance, the form 
grabber module for Mozilla Firefox and the back connect module (the latter offering 
the botnet owners to have a direct access to the console of the infected computer), 
were sold for around $2,000. People interested in particular features can post their 
advertisement on such underground forums, and offer money to those who could 
develop the requested customized software. 
 
4.1.2. Zeus communication protocol 
Like most banking trojans, the Zeus’s goal is to steal sensitive information that could 
lead the attacker to carry out a financial fraud against the victim. The Zeus ecosystem is 
usually composed of three different entities: the bot, e.g. the machine that has been 
infected, the Command and Center — here in after C&C, or dropzone — i.e. the main 
server where the control panel is hosted and where the bots send the stolen information, 
and the configuration server: the server where the configuration file is hosted, ready to 
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be downloaded by the bots. The C&C and the configuration server usually overlap their 
role, offering to botnet owners the comfort of administering only one server. 
Once the victim’s computer is infected, the malware hooks every API call in order to 
grab sensitive information before it is sent through the network. In this way, the 
malware is able to steal HTTPS sessions before they are encrypted, and also to send 
them to the C&C. Stolen information mainly resides in HTML input data forms, POP, 
FTP accounts credentials, X509 certificates stored in the browser, and cookies saved 
in the sys-tem. Occasionally, the botnet owner can also request a screen snapshot to 
the owned bots, forcing them to send a screenshot of what they are currently looking 
at. 
Stolen data is regularly sent to the botnet’s dropzone through two different 
communication channels. The first one, referred in the Zeus configuration file as log, 
consists in a small keep-alive message containing all the main status information about 
the zombie i.e. botID, botnetID, IP-address, bot OS, etc. Notably, this packet is sent to 
the dropzone every two minutes by default, and consists in the most frequent 
communication type between the zombie and its C&C. Thus, its periodic emission 
could be leveraged by an anomaly based IDS to identify an infected computer inside a 
network. The second communication flow used by Zeus, referred as report, occurs less 
frequently than the log one i.e. by default every ten minutes. As well as the zombie 
status information included in the log packet, it contains also all the data that has been 
stolen in the system. Hence, this message is usually bigger than the previous one, and 
packet fragmentation according to the network MTU size is often required by the OS 
for sending the entire TCP segment. 
The TCP packet structure of the Zeus report communication is shown in Figure 1. 
The packet begins with a 48 bytes long header, followed by n bytes containing the 
body, which is divided into several items containing all the stolen information 
categorized by prefixed labels. The header consists of 20 bytes of random padding, 
followed by 12 bytes used for the header info and 16 used to store the MD5 hash of 
the Zeus body. The header info is composed of three slots of four bytes each, 
respectively containing the Zeus body size, the Zeus item flags and the number of 
Zeus items contained in the body. Zeus item flags are used to indicate whether the 
Zeus body is compressed and, if so, how to manage contained items. The MD5 hash is 
used by the control panel as integrity verification: once the C&C receives the 
message, it firstly calculates the MD5 of the body, and then compares it with the one 
stored in the packet. If the two hashes match, the packet is processed by the C&C; 
otherwise the packet is dropped. 
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Each Zeus item is composed by a 16 
bytes long item header and an item 
body with a variable length. The 
item header is divided into four 4 
bytes long slots containing the 
itemID, a zero padding string, and 
the length of the item body. Note 
that the last two slots represent the 
same information — a clear rational 
for this is currently missing. The 
item header is used to identify the 
information by its type and to 
anticipate the length of its body. In 
this way, the Zeus control panel 
knows how to dissect the received 
packet, and it is able to store each 
item in the correct SQL field. Table 
1 shows the main Zeus item IDs 
used to identify the stolen 
information. The values of items 
10002 and 10003 are constant, 
and are fixed at the time of the mal-
ware creation1. We refer to these 
items as trojan items. As for the 
other items, they are variable and strictly depend on the infected system — we refer to 
them as environmental items. It is important to note that all the stolen cookies are 
stored into the item id 10009, which can reach several Mbytes of length. Indeed, the 
more cookies the system has, the bigger the entire packet will be. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 While item 10002 is specified by the bot master, item 10003, which defines the bot version, is hard coded within the Zeus Builer toolkit. 
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ItemID Value 
10001 SBCID BOT ID 
10002 SBCID BOTNET 
10003 SBCID BOT VERSION 
10005 SBCID NET LATENCY 
10006 SBCID TCPPORT S1 
10007 SBCID PATH SOURCE 
10008 SBCID PATH DEST 
10009 SBCID TIME SYSTEM 
10010 SBCID TIME TICK 
10011 SBCID TIME LOCALBIAS 
10012 SBCID OS INFO 
10013 SBCID LANGUAGE ID 
10014 SBCID PROCESS NAME 
10015 SBCID PROCESS USER 
10016 SBCID IPV4 ADDRESSES 
10017 SBCID IPV6 ADDRESSES 
10018 SBCID BOTLOG TYPE 
10019 SBCID BOTLOG 
 
4.1.3. Zeus crypto routines 
Since its first version, the Zeus trojan encrypts the network communication with its 
C&C in order to avoid identification by pattern-recognition algorithms used by the IDS. 
The Zeus 1.x malware version used to encrypt its data using the RC4 stream cipher [17], 
which offers a fast and lightweight encryption in terms of CPU consumption. Indeed, 
since one XOR operation over a PC word can take from four to eight CPU clocks to be 
completed, a 2GHz CPU could successfully execute from 250M to 500M XOR/s. 
Besides performance, the RC4 algorithm is also very easy to implement, considering 
that it can be written from scratch in just few lines. The RC4 seed the security of the 
encryption algorithm relies upon is set by the botnet owner during the malware sample 
building phase. Once the malware is executed, the seed (also key in the following) is 
stored in a pre-defined and fixed memory space, ready to be used every time the bot 
needs to download a new configuration file, or needs to send the stolen information. 
Notably, the RC4 initialization vector is reused at every invocation, meaning that every 
out-going packet will be encrypted starting from the beginning of the keystream. The 
research results provided in this paper were a direct result of leveraging this 
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4 
implementation weakness, al-lowing us to reuse the reconstructed parts of the 
keystream to decipher the configuration file. 
For previous Zeus versions, researchers used to have several ways to automatically find 
out the key and to decrypt the traffic between the bot and its C&C. As long as the 
encryption key was stored in a fixed address space, the researchers could automatically 
dump all the volatile memory of the infected machine and extract the data contained 
inside a known range space. When the second version of the Zeus malware came out, it 
introduced a new layer of encryption and a new way to dynamically store its key in 
memory. Because of this, all the automated frame-works developed around Zeus 1.x 
needed to be completely re-viewed. 
The version analyzed in this paper, Zeus 2.0.8.9, further introduced a new layer of 
obfuscation on its data communication process between the infected machine and the 
C&C. Developers who added this additional obfuscation layer probably wanted to avoid 
IDSs from detecting known patterns previously learnt by Zeus 1.x malware analysis. The 
sequence diagram in Figure 2 summarizes the encryption and obfuscation routines used 
by the analyzed Zeus malware. Thus, after decrypting certain RC4 Zeus network traffic, 
an additional decryption function needs to be invoked to break the entire cipher ring — 
enabling recovery of the corresponding plain text. Notably, our research demonstrates 
that this additional encryption layer does not really hinder cryptanalysis. As outlined in 
further sections, this finding allowed us to identify certain malicious traffic pat-terns 
without necessarily breaking the obfuscation layer. 
At the time of writing, there are several Zeus variants in the wild, due to the source code 
leakage. Some of them introduce the same domain flux technique used by Confiker and 
Torpig to evade DNS sink-holing, and P2P communications as main communication 
channel between the bots and their C&C. However, apart for a specific variant that uses 
AES instead of RC4[34], the encryption mechanism has not been drastically altered 
from the previous version, preserving the applicability of our findings also to the latest 
Zeus version.  
 
4.2 Zeus Control Panel 
The HTTP control panel is in charge of decrypting incoming communications, sent 
by the botnet’s zombies to their C&C, and to encrypt the relative answers. Its code is 
written in PHP, and includes three pages in its root directory: cp.php, gate.php and 
install.php. The leaked Zeus 2.0.8.9 source code was analyzed, taking advantage of 
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the fact that all the code is well commented at every function point and, although 
comments are written in Russian/Cyrillic, it was possible to obtain a reasonable 
translation using the Google Translate web service [33]. 
The install.php file is an executable page that automatically configures the server 
environment with the malware requirements. The installation process takes a few 
minutes: once the botmaster has inserted the environment information into the install 
page (such as DB server credentials and user admin pass-word) the script takes care of 
filling in the database with the SQL schema needed for the botnet control panel. 
Besides the installation page, cp.php is the main page where the botmaster logs into 
for controlling the botnet. This web page mainly represents the status of the botnet by 
querying the mySQL database, and offers the capability to send custom commands to 
the owned bots. The PHP page handling the incoming HTTP POST messages is 
gate.php, where our attention was particularly focused on. 
The code inside this page is in charge of decrypting the ciphered TCP flow incoming 
from the botnet zombies, and to dissect the payload into different variables, as previously 
outlined. Further-more, the code takes care of filling in the database with the retrieved 
information in clear text. The decryption functions used in this web page are stored in an 
external file, global.php, which resides in the system directory. The obfuscation and 
the decryption routines detailed later on were analyzed by closely studying these two 
files. 
4.3. Malware analysis methodology 
In the current section, we formally define the proposed key extraction and malicious 
traffic detection methods. Let v1 and v2 be infected computers running in a controlled 
environment and belonging to a botnet bt1. Let envv1,i and envv2,i be Zeus environmental 
items of v1 and v2 respectively — remind that those values are known. Let also ωbt1 
be the Zeus trojan item, with value and size unknown to us. The plain text of a Zeus 
report issued by v1 is composed of: 
Rv1 = [header, envv1,0, ωbt1, envv1,1, ..., envv1,l] 
where the header is unknown and depends on the body, which is composed of envv1,i and 
ωbt1. Analogously, the plain text Rv2 is composed of: 
Rv2 = [header, envv2,0, ωbt1, envv2,1, ..., envv2,l]. 
Note that the item ωbt1 is common to all bots in the botnet bt1. Moreover, reports 
issued by bots belonging to the same botnet follow the same structure. Each of these 
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reports is then encrypted in order to obtain packets C and D, respectively issued by v1 
and v2. 
By merging this information with the knowledge acquired during the Zeus Toolkit code 
analysis, we can identify certain parts of the plain text message, i.e. envv1,i and envv2,i, that 
will be encrypted and sent to the C&C. As discussed before, the Zeus malware does not 
update the RC4 initialization vector, exposing its communications to key reuse attacks. 
This weakness 
permitted us to 
develop a 
chosen-plaintext 
attack, based on 
the known 
environmental 
items, against the 
encrypted stream 
that flows 
between the bot 
and its C&C. In 
particular, we 
were able to 
retrieve the 
keystream —
from the cipher 
text—, and to 
reuse it to detect infected network traffic. To this goal, we focused on the biggest 
encrypted packet that a Zeus infected computer periodically sends to its C&C, which 
includes a full report of the stolen information. 
4.3.1. Cryptanalysis 
The RC4 is a stream cipher that uses a bit-wise exclusive-or (XOR) operation between 
the plain text (P) and the keystream (K) generated by a pseudo-random number 
generation algorithm (PRNG). Note that the XOR is subject to the cancellation 
propriety: P ⊕ K = C; P ⊕ C = K. 
The cipher text C is contained inside an HTTP POST request made by the infected 
computer to its drop zone, therefore the entire data payload needs to be extracted from 
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the network flow before being correctly decrypted. However, the new version of Zeus 
introduces an obfuscation mechanism that consists in re-cursively XORing every byte 
with its previous one, while the first byte of the plain text is simply copied into the 
obfuscated string. Algorithms 1 and 2 show the pseudo-code of the obfuscation routines 
visual Encrypt() and visual Decrypt() used by this malware version. 
Note that, as a result of Algorithm 1, the unknown terms in a Zeus report header are 
propagated through the obfuscated string. However, in the following we prove that a 
derivate key γ can be obtained and used to extract the last m elements of any string 
ciphered using key K, regardless of the 
application of Algorithm 1. 
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4.3.2. Key 
Extraction 
algorithm 
One of the 
aims of this 
research 
was to 
obtain 
enough 
parts of γ 
needed to 
decipher the Zeus configuration file, which is usually around 69 KBytes 
[30]. By 
executing a 
Zbot sample in 
our sandbox, it 
was possible to 
build a packet 
containing 
chosen-
plaintext by 
inflating a 
modified 
cookie, i.e. 
here in after 
contrast-
cookie, with 
ordinary 
strings. The 
contrast-
cookie takes a 
relevant role 
because it 
allows us to 
enrich our chosen-plaintext to obtain a bigger known plain text, which 
implies being able to consecutively retrieve the desired size of γ. On top of 
that, we were able to extract the last m bytes of the derivate key γ and to 
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7 
decipher the configuration file without knowing neither the RC4 keystream 
K nor its seed. In addition, the pro-posed approach would also save the 
researchers from carrying out the static malware analysis to search either the 
keystream or the seed in the system volatile memory. 
Note that, according to Theorem 1, the derivate key γ can be applied to any 
string Z obtained when ciphering a string Q formed by a set of n unknown 
values and m known ones with key K; however, in order to obtain γ, it is 
necessary to establish a correspondence between pi and p′i, which requires 
to know n in advance. As stated in Section 3, a Zeus report contains two 
unknown substrings: the Zeus header and the Zeus trojan item 10002, i.e. 
the botnet-id. Although the length of the Zeus header is known, this is not 
the case for the Zeus botnet-id. Given that the mentioned field has a limited 
length, we tackle with this issue by performing a brute-force attack on the 
Zeus botnet-id item body length. 
According to the Zeus packet structure explained before, the length of 
every Zeus item body is declared in 4 bytes of its header. Thus, the 
maximum length of the field is 232 bytes long. However, the Zeus Builder 
toolkit does not allow to create malwares containing a botnet-id value 
bigger than 20 characters. Therefore, we just need to make an attempt over 
20 different positions as for where to insert our known environ-mental item 
values. Algorithm 3 is in charge of creating the set of all the possible 
obfuscated texts O′, depending on their different lengths. Note that in line 5 
the insert function is used for adding the character “A” at the fixed 
position2 x, and shifting all the next values by one byte in the string. The 
algorithm takes the chosen-plaintext as input, and returns a multimodal-
array with all the related obfuscated texts. 
Once we generate our set of O′, we can use it for retrieving the derivate 
key as explained before. The key extraction pseudo code is expressed in 
Algorithm 4. 
• Lines 1-4 The function extractKS() is called with three arguments: the 
intercepted payload C, the chosen-plain text P′ previously generated, as 
well as a second payload 
D, corresponding to another infected computer belonging to the same 
botnet. 
                                                          
2 This position depends on the length of the Zeus item id 10001 
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• Line 5 The set of 
obfuscated texts O′ 
is created in order 
to test all possible 
lengths of Zeus’ 
botnet-id item. 
• Lines 6-12 A 
derivate keys 
matrix S is 
generated as 
explained before, 
where every 
element S i 
corresponds to one 
possible Zeus 
botnet-id item 
length. 
• Lines 13-20 In 
order to discover 
the appropriate 
derivate key, every key Si is tested against the second payload D. As a 
result, a matrix O′′ containing all the possible decryptions of D is 
obtained. Moreover, the entropy of each possible decryption is 
computed in line 18. 
• Lines 21- 24 The appropriate derivate key Sv = γ is identified due to 
the lower entropy Ei resulting of its application to the payload D. 
Once a reasonable part of γ is successfully extracted, it is sent to Cronus in 
order to let it be able to identify Zeus traffic by performing deep packet 
inspection. 
4.3.3 Cronus: an IDSfor Zeus 
Our research further demonstrates how the entropy of these obfuscated 
messages O remains nearly constant, allowing us to automatically identify 
malicious traffic even if it is not fully de obfuscated. This propriety derives 
from the zero padding strings used by Zeus for composing its messages. 
 
Page   42  
  
As can be seen in Figure 3, when these strings are obfuscated by the 
Cronus() routine, the resulting output contains several text parts with 
repeated characters (these parts are evidenced in the cited figure). As a 
result, the calculated entropy drastically de-creases in comparison with the 
one calculated for the cipher text. 
Algorithm 5 illustrates the pseudo code of Cronus, the pro-posed Zeus IDS. 
The algorithm works as follows: a) once the suspicious HTTP payload has 
been filtered out, it is passed as an argument to the makeitPlain() function. 
b) The Shannon 
en-tropy H of the 
message is then 
calculated and, if 
it is higher than 
the threshold α, it 
means that the 
analyzed payload 
C is encrypted. 
Hence, the 
algorithm can 
continue its flow3. 
c) 
 
The function continues with the RC4() routine which XOR-decrypts C with 
all the γ values previously collected and, for each decrypted output O, the 
routine calcentropy() is called to calculate its entropy H′. d) If H′ is 
lower than β, it means that O is likely to be a Zeus obfuscated message. As 
said, there is no need to deobfuscate O in order to confirm the detection. 
It is important to note that the condition |γi| ≥ |C| should be verified 
before calling the Cronus function. Because of this, we are able to identify 
only those packets with cardinality less or equal than the collected key one, 
meaning that the key should be big enough (300 Bytes at least) to correctly 
                                                          
3 Note that from Information Theory we know that the Shannon entropy is not increased by more than the length of the 
encryption key. However, dealing with RC4 encryption, the encryption key is as long as the plaintext is. There-fore, our choice of 
the Shannon entropy to discriminate whether a message is encrypted is meaningful. 
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decrypt a Zeus log message and determine its maliciousness. By considering 
that this could raise a performance issue for Cronus due to collecting several 
keys and use them to analyze each HTTP POST packet, we focused on only 
searching for short and delimited parts of Zeus packets and analyze them 
accordingly. 
We found two different patterns that, once encrypted and obfuscated, 
always maintain certain contents at the same position, and keep their 
entropy values constant. 
In order to find a pat-
tern useful to identify a 
Zeus traffic, we need to 
use the static parts of its 
messages with contents 
changing as less as 
possible, and that are always located at the same position of the Zeus 
message. Given these constraints, we focused on the 12 bytes reserved for 
the Zeus header info, and the 16 bytes reserved for the first Zeus item 
header. While other item header’s positions are variable, i.e. depend on the 
size of the previous item body, those headers can always be found at the 
same position of the TCP packet’s payload, i.e. between byte 20 and byte 
31, and between byte 48 and byte 63 respectively. 
Pattern 1: Zeus header info – The 12 bytes long Zeus header info contains 
information about the Zeus body size, the item flags, and the number of 
items. The body size of a typical Zeus log message is around 300 bytes, 
thus, by considering that the maximum number of bits used to represent 
this number is 17, and that four bytes are used for encoding the Zeus body 
size, in the worst case one entire byte will always be set to zero. Next, the 
four bytes long Zeus item flags follow a certain structure: the first byte is 
used as a binary selector in order to inform if the packet is compressed or 
not, the second byte is used for the instructing the control panel about how 
to manage the Zeus items if they are encrypted, while the third byte is used 
for reducing the risk of item overlapping. Finally, the last byte is never 
used, and is always set to zero. Although we can definitely assert that in the 
worst case one byte will be always set to null, it is interesting to note that 
all the Zeus log messages that we analyzed during our research, always 
kept these four bytes to zero. Lastly, by considering that in the Zeus control 
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panel source code 
only 45 different 
items are 
encoded, only 
one byte of the 
four allocated 
will be enough to 
represent the 
number of the 
items contained 
inside a Zeus 
message. 
Pattern 2: Zeus 
item header– 
Recalling the 
Zeus packet structure exposed in Section 3, the 16 bytes long Zeus item 
header contains the itemID, four null bytes, and an identical pair of four 
bytes containing the item body’s length. Therefore, as we have already 
showed, 232 bits are used to express the item’s length in bytes. The botID is 
composed of the infected computer’s Net-Bios name, which can be 15 byte 
length at maximum, and a 17 bytes long string randomly generated by the 
malware in order to assure a unique botID. Hence, the Zeus item body’s 
length can be 32 bytes at maximum and only one of the four allocated bytes 
may be used to express this information, while the other three bytes will 
always contain zero values. As showed in Table 2, the first Zeus item header 
contains several null bytes. 
Table 3 summarizes the pattern values by highlighting the number of null 
bytes present in the worst case. Due to their nature, these headers always 
contain several zero strings that drastically decrease the string entropy value. 
Notably, by using more bytes than required, the malware coder 
compromised its own obfuscation algorithm by making its output easily 
detectable. Based on these findings, our research demonstrates that the 
proposed IDS can identify certain Zeus traffic with only 36 bytes long keys. 
In this way, the performance of Cronus storing and analyzing all the 
captured HTTP POST requests significantly increases in comparison to 
storing 1500 bytes long keys. 
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Finally, once the Zeus bot communication identified, several further actions 
could be taken. For instance, the traffic could be blocked by a network 
firewall. This can be easily achieved with Cronus sending the information 
needed to update the firewall rules in order to deny all the traffic directed to 
the Zeus C&C. The α and /3 entropy thresholds used during our 
experiments are shown in Table 4. These thresholds have been set after a 
learning phase which included calculating the entropy of 100 Zeus plain 
texts with their corresponding obfuscated and encrypted transformation. 
Note that these 
values are 
completely 
customizable.  
 
 
4.4. Experimental 
Settings 
The different 
phases of our 
experiment are 
described in the 
following section. In 
order to test Cronus, 
we set up a testing 
environment, which 
comprises an in-house Zeus botnet that includes a C&C, a dropzone, two 
computers to infect (v1 and v2), and a web server where a fake banking 
webpage is running. Once the testing environment was configured, we 
created a Zeus trojan binary and executed it in v1 and v2. Furthermore, we 
analyzed the generated network traffic in order to extract certain parts of 
the derivate key. Finally, we used those keys to develop Cronus, an IDS 
able to detect Zeus traffic in a production network. 
4.4.1. Set up of the testing environment In the first phase, we recreated a 
complete Zeus environment in an isolated network. This task has been 
accomplished by customizing the Dorothy framework [11] that is currently 
employed for similar research initiatives. Such a framework is built upon a 
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VMWare ESXi 
infrastructure that is 
automatically piloted trough 
the Dorothy Console, i.e. a 
Ruby gem installed on an 
external machine which is in 
charge to start, stop and 
revert the virtual machines, 
besides running executables 
inside them once transferred. 
The framework comes with 
a network analysis module 
(NAM) which relies on a 
pcapr-local [31] in-stance 
that is dedicated to dissect 
and store the analyzed traffic 
into a non-SQL database for 
allowing fast and indexed 
searches. Such module is in 
charge of recording and 
dissecting all the net-work 
traffic generated by the 
sandboxes for the whole 
execution of the VMs. , we 
configured four different 
virtual machines: a Linux 
Debian distribution was used 
for configuring the Zeus 
control panel and its 
dropzone and two Windows 
virtual machines were 
selected as sandboxes for the 
malware execution. Finally, 
another Linux-based VM 
was used for running a fake 
bank website. The Windows 
sandboxes come with a Windows XP SP3 default installation, with Internet 
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1 0  
Explorer 7 installed on it. In addition, a contrast-cookie, associated to the 
local fake bank website was inserted in the default IE system cookies folder 
/Documents and Settings/userhome/Cookies of both 
sandboxes, and modified in order to contain a big quan-tity of repeated 
strings (we tested a contrast-cookie up to 700 Kbyte large). The fake web 
server ran on a TomCat server, which replicated the login page of a known 
home banking web-site. The local DNS server was configured 
consequentially in order to resolve the real bank site URL with the local IP 
address. A summarized scheme of the test environment is presented in 
Figure 4. 
Finally, we used the provided Zeus Builder to create a new malware 
sample mw1 and its relative configuration file conf1 and moved them to the 
sandboxes and to the dropzone respectively. The configuration file contains 
the local IP addresses of our testing environment as dropzone and C&C. 
Through this file, we configured our bots v1 and v2 in order to 
communicate with the C&C every two minutes, and to send the full system 
reports every four minutes. Notably, these reports contain all the system 
cookies, including our inflated contrast-cookie. 
4.4.2. Malware execution and Key extraction 
The whole malware analysis process is described in Figure 5. The 
process begins by transferring mw1 to the sandboxes, and executing it with 
administrative privileges. We define the zombified timeframe Ate as the 
interval At between the time of the malware execution and the time when 
the virtual machines v1 and v2 are reverted to their not malicious activities. 
During Ate, the NAM records all network traffic generated by the 
infected VMs, and stores it in a PCAP file. At the early age of its infection, 
the infected systems attempt to retrieve the encrypted configuration file by 
making HTTP GET requests to the Zeus C&C (Step 1). Notably, the C&C 
IP address/domain name is hard coded inside the malware binary, and it 
could be revealed by conducting a binary static analysis. Just after the 
execution of the malware, both sandboxes are automatically driven to visit 
the fake bank website, and to enter fake login credentials (Step 2). Web 
automation is accomplished by executing a customized macro of the 
iMacros plugin [35], which successfully emulates the usual human internet 
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browsing activity. 
After con f1 is downloaded, each infected system deciphers it and extracts 
the information related to the botnet dropzone do-main name/IP address. At 
this point, the bot begins to make two different types of HTTP POST 
requests to the C&C (Step 3), i.e. Zeus logs and reports. Differently from 
the first type of request, 
the size of the data 
transmitted in the Zeus 
report depends on the 
information stored in the 
infected computer. As 
previously outlined, we 
leveraged this propriety 
to inflate our contrast-
cookie in order to extract 
enough parts of the 
keystream needed to 
further decrypt con f1. 
An example of a 
decrypted report 
message (where relevant 
parts are highlighted), 
can be seen in Figure 6. 
After Ate, the sandbox 
virtual machines are 
reverted to their original 
state, and the saved 
network dump is 
analyzed inside the NAM 
by dissecting it and extracting all the network flows recorded during the 
analyzed time (Step 4). Consecutively, the Dorothy Console analyzes them 
by filtering out only those flows related to HTTP traffic directed to the local 
Zeus C&C, and then extracts the payload of the largest ones, which 
supposedly contain the stolen cookies of v1 and v2. Once the ciphered flows 
have been filtered out, they are used for extracting the derivate key as 
explained in Section 4 (Step 5). 
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Finally, the returned keystream is used for decrypting the encrypted 
configuration file, and if the retrieved output gives acceptable entropy (H′ ≤ 
¡3), then the tuple < mwi, γi > can be sent to the Cronus database (Step 6). 
Notably, this operation is accomplished by the Dorothy Console which 
connects the NAM with the production network, e.g. where Cronus resides. 
 
4.4.3. Malicious traffic identification 
The last phase consists of detecting certain Zeus traffic on a production 
network, having a set of valid Zeus keystreams Γ = {γ0, γ1, ..., γi}, 
obtained as detailed in previous subsection. To perform this test, we set up 
five different virtual machines V = {v0, ..., v4} in an isolated network (Step 
7), which constantly generate common network traffic towards a fixed hosts 
range S = {s0, s2, ..., si}, e.g. web browsing and POP mail consulting. Next, 
we infected one of them with a previously created Zeus malware sample 
mw1, and recorded all network traffic generated by this machine during Ate 
(Step 7). Another virtual machine is configured as network sniffer in order to 
analyze all network traffic going through the network. This latter VM also 
executes our Proof of Concept (PoC) for Cronus, which is designed to scrub 
all HTTP POST requests identified in the net-work flow (Step 8), and trigger 
an alert whenever a malicious pattern is detected (Step 9). It is relevant to 
note that the net-work flows analyzed by Cronus discarded HTTPS traffic, 
other-wise the algorithm would waste time and resources by trying to 
decrypt a non-RC4 traffic. Additionally, other filtering proprieties, e.g. white 
lists, can be added to reduce false positives and to avoid unnecessary load 
charge on Cronus that can be generated by analyzing legitimate traffic. 
Finally, if Cronus returns positive results for an analyzed network flow, we 
can claim that vi has been infected by mw1, and that si is a specific Zeus 
C&C which has been proved to be online during during Ate. 
The Cronus PoC was developed to decipher all the suspicious traffic 
identified in the network traffic. Since the Zeus botnet is based on the HTTP 
protocol, and the stolen information is sent to the dropzone through HTTP 
POST requests, the following is recognized as suspicious traffic and 
analyzed by Cronus: 
1. TCP traffic; 
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2. An HTTP POST request containing an encrypted body.  
While filtering a TCP network stream is quite easy, filtering HTTP 
POST requests requires analyzing the upper lever of the TCP protocol. 
This technique is commonly referred as deep packet inspection and 
requires a fast CPU in order to process the network flow in reasonable 
times. The proposed Cronus PoC was developed in Ruby language, and 
can be deployed and executed on any system with the Ruby Framework 
installed on it. 
Next section reports on the results of our experiment. 
 
 
4.4. Evaluation of the results 
In this section we describe the applicability of the proposed approach 
inside a corporate network during a regular working day. The goal of this 
experiment was to demonstrate that the proposed approach could be used 
in a real scenario; by offering to the network administrator the capability to 
detect Zeus infected systems. 
4.1. Environment configuration 
As first step we created a customized Zeus Trojan V. 2.0.8.9 by using the 
toolkit leaked on Internet. The malware was con-figured in order to 
communicate to our internal server where a Zeus control panel was 
previously set up. In addition, we de-fined an interval of 2 minutes for the 
Zeus log messages, and 10 minutes for the report ones. The experiment 
began by executing an instance of tcpdump in a machine which was 
physically connected to a SPAN port of the corporate router. In order to limit 
the impact of the experiment, the SPAN port was configured in order to 
redirect only the network traffic belonging to a VLAN composed by 13 host, 
i.e. 11 desktop computers used by researchers for their daily job, and 2 
virtual machines dedicated for the experiment’s purpose. Cronus was 
executed in a Linux Debian Etch machine, with 2Gb of dedicated memory 
and a 2.6Ghz CPU. 
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The sniffer began to record the local traffic at 9:50 AM , and lasted its 
activity for the next 5 hours. At 11:35 AM, a Windows XP SP3 virtual 
machine inside the same network was infected with the previously generated 
malware, and an instance of iMacros was configured to mimic a typical web 
browsing activity by executing a macro which starts from the Google News 
web page and browses its link every 10 minutes. At 3:00 PM, the tcpdump 
instance was stopped, and an overall of 17.50 GB of network traffic were 
correctly collected. 
The malware keystream was previously extracted by using the explained 
approach, and it was stored into a text file which was already containing 
28 different keys. In addition, 200 more different keys were inserted into 
the key file, in 
order to assess the 
computational 
overhead 
experienced by 
Cronus during the 
keys loading 
function7. 
Once the 
network dump was 
generated, it was 
moved to the 
Cronus machine. 
Cronus was configured to load a file containing 229 different keys but to 
test only the first 30 in order to simulate a real case scenario4 
6.2. Results 
Cronus analyzed 7,133,170 TCP packets finding 5,990 HTTP POST 
requests, 141 of them containing an encrypted payload. For each of these, 30 
different keys were tried in order to de-cipher the payload and retrieve a 
reasonable entropy result. As result, 138 HTTP POST requests were 
correctly identified as Zeus traffic. 
                                                          
4 8We decided to test only 30 keys because at the time of this writing, there are only 26 Zeus active domains standing to Zeus 
Tracker[30]. 
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Figure 7 shows that the three missing encrypted POST re-quests didn’t 
belong to the infected machine (host-5), thus are not false negatives. 
However, after a manual analysis of the packets sent by the infected machine, 
we discovered that it generated 139 HTTP POST packets toward the Zeus 
C&C. The packet which was not detected by Cronus belonged to the Zeus 
report communication flow, which contains all the cookies of the infected 
system. As 
explained 
before, this 
packet is 
typically 
larger than 
the network 
MTU, and 
packet 
fragmentatio
n is often 
needed to 
correctly 
send it. As a 
matter of 
fact, the TCP 
segment was 5785 bytes large, and it was splited in 9 frames. The first frame, 
contained only the HTTP POST header, and it was correctly detected by 
Cronus. However, the following ones were not detected because they did not 
contain the POST keyword inside their body — as showed, Cronus only 
considers these packets for its purpose. It is important to note that big Zeus 
report packets are definitely less frequent than the log ones. Hence, taking 
into account packet reassembling would not sensibly contribute to enhance 
the detection rate, while drastically decreasing the analysis performance. 
Figure 8 highlights the frequency of all the HTTP POST re-quests sent by 
the most active hosts. Note that host-5 has a constant request rate, that 
identifies the typical Zeus log message activity. Interestingly, this graph 
could help a system administrator to identify suspicious Zeus traffic by only 
mapping over time the host HTTP POST requests. 
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The time of the analysis was of 5.39 minutes, which means that the estimated 
throughput of the proposed IDS is around 400 Mbit/s. The performance of 
Cronus strictly depends on the number of the keys tested, and on the network 
dump file size. 
However, as 
showed in 
Figure 9, the 
number of 
tested keys does 
not drastically 
impact on the 
execution time5 
if we consider 
that there are 
less than 90 
different Zeus 
botnet spotted 
in the wild. 
However, as the file size grows, the execution time increases as well, 
according to a linear relationship. 
4.5. Lessons learnt 
One of the main contributions of this paper, apart from the detailed 
techniques outlined so far, is the fact that we have high-lighted a general 
methodology to attack a class of malware that can be considered generic 
enough to account for a reasonable part of the total amount of malware 
posing a serious threat to the Internet. The approach can be essentially 
decomposed into the following steps: 1. Isolating crypto modules of the 
malware from the rest of the application; 2. analyzing the crypto modules as 
for their operating procedures; 3. discovering flaws in the crypto modules. 
Note that the weaknesses we have been investigating concern the 
composition of the crypto module with the rest of the application; we did not 
focus on breaking the crypto algorithm. In our investigation, we have not 
devoted re-sources to make an attempt to break the RC4 implementation the 
crypto module is based upon. Instead, with the above high-lighted approach, 
we have discovered two weaknesses: a. the crypto module is subject to a re-
                                                          
5The execution time values has been calculated by executing Cronus on a16,5 Mb large PCAP. 
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initialization attack; b. the plain text to be encrypted can be provided in input 
to the algorithm. These two weaknesses, combined with the fact that the 
onetime pad encryption (based on the keystream generated by the RC4) is 
subject to the cancelation property, have paved the way to our attack in 
recovering a relevant portion of the keystream. It may be legitimate to think 
that another weakness is represented by the short length of the botnet-id 
field. Although a bigger botnet-id would certainly impact on the keystream’s 
recovered fragments, it would also imply several drawbacks for the C&C 
server management: this unique field is used to update botnet information for 
every incoming packet, thus doing a MySQL distinct query by filtering a —
let us suppose— 28 bytes long botnet-id would be cumbersome in terms of 
system resources. In addition, Zeus log communications length between the 
bot and its C&C, would drastically increase, hence making them easier to 
detect6. 
The sequel of our technique and proposed architecture has just been an 
exercise of security engineering and secure net-work design. Interestingly, 
the attack we proposed is just a reviewed version of the Crib-based one used 
at Bletchley Park while breaking the Enigma crypto system [35]: the known 
Zeus environmental items represented our cribs and the proposed key 
extraction algorithms our bombe. We can definitely assert that old-fashion 
sound cryptanalysis still works, even 70 years later. 
Finally, it is important to note that while the proposed technique is unique 
to Zeus malware versions prior to 2.0.8.9 and to some later variants that 
still continue to use the same crypto routine, trends of malware flaws in the 
implementation and use of crypto algorithms (like the exploited one) could 
be potentially used as directions for reverse engineering of other malware 
in the wild. 
 
                                                          
6 Reader who might be interested in finding out more about the counter-measures which could be used to avoid the exposed detection 
mechanism may contact us. As a result of an internal discussion it was decided to not disclose those techniques in this paper to avoid it 
being used by malware developers. 
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5. CHAPTER II: APP and mobile Malware 
Mobile devices, such as the smartphones and tablets are playing an 
increasingly important role in how people communicate, socialize, and 
carry out other important daily tasks including accessing their banking 
activities. Newer network technologies as well as the mobile devices will 
progressively increase security aspects that would contribute to the wider 
range of mobile applications and services. 
Mobile applications stores (App-Stores) are no exception and the recent 
popularity of different mobile App-Stores such as the Google’s Android 
Market, and Apple’s App-Store, is a clear evidence to support the above 
statement. 
According to an article by Minda Zetlin (Zetlin, 2011) [37], a number of 
Android users, in the year 2010, downloaded different mobile banking 
applications (Apps) from the Google's Android Market at a cost of $1.50 
each. The Apps enabled the users to connect with about 40 major banks, 
including the Bank of America and the Wells Fargo of the United States. It 
later appeared that the banks did not upload those Apps and that those Apps 
were in fact submitted by some unknown fraudsters to different App-
Stores, seeking to only make $1.50 from each download. Needless to 
mention the potential threat of the fraudsters being able to steal the 
users’ banking login credentials, as a result of the users downloading those 
malicious banking Apps. It was also the reason why many banks asked 
their customers to actually have their mobile service provider remove those 
malicious Apps from their mobile devices (Zetlin, 2011). [37] 
Another work (Goodin, 2011) stated that the Google’s Android Market 
had to remove at least a dozen smartphone games out of the Android 
Market after discovering they contained secret code that was sending text 
messages (SMS) to a premium number and the users having to bear the 
high costs of those text messages (Goodin, 2011) [36]. 
Moving on, the recent evolution within the mobile banking ecosystem 
clearly indicates that the access to banking through mobile devices will 
move from browsers to mobile Apps. Moreover, a great part of the security 
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will depend on how secure is the actual App-Store as that is where a user 
would download their banking App from, in order to access their mobile 
banking and other financial activities. It is therefore vital to address these 
growing malicious Apps threats and one of the measures could include 
outlining some sort of common policies for different App-Stores, enabling 
them to better manage their Apps delivery mechanisms. 
In this work research, we aim to outline a proposal on common policies for 
mobile Apps management mechanisms for different mobile App-Stores. 
Therefore, an assessment of the major mobile App-Stores was carried out 
in order to establish an understanding of their current Apps 
delivery/monitoring mechanisms. This included the current procedures 
involved in uploading, downloading, and upgrading the Apps to/from an 
App-Store along with the current reporting mechanisms deployed by 
different App-Stores for the malicious Apps reporting. 
 
5.1 A discussion on different mobile APP-Stores Applications 
Management Mechanisms. 
There are a number of unique challenges and pieces to application 
security that most devices currently, are not able to provide. Similarly, all 
major mobile platforms bear different Apps delivery mechanisms and 
hence the associated risks also differ to a certain extent. One of the 
common major tasks however, for all mobile Apps platforms/providers is 
to ensure the Apps authenticity and a secure management/delivery 
mechanism for all Apps available on their App-Stores. 
The differences between the capabilities of platforms have a significant 
impact on the management of their security. Managing the Apps delivery 
mechanism is all about the capabilities of a mobile devices platform/App-
Store to monitor/authenticate the legality of an App’s source. Being able 
to keep a track/record of where an App came from can be vital to deploy 
appropriate countermeasures against a malicious or a fraudulent App. 
Furthermore, the rapid changes in this largely consumer driven mobile 
devices market mean that code is quickly written, deployed and replaced 
or even upgraded. Development platforms that support the writing of a 
secure code are currently lacking for the mobile devices. This is 
particularly the case for the mobile devices Operating Systems (OS) 
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which are often written in either “C” or other native languages leaving 
security totally at the discretion of the developer. 
Therefore, balancing the restrictions imposed by application delivery 
mechanisms while ensuring an acceptable level of versatility and usability 
of the smart phone is a challenge for the Apps providers/vendors. Some 
vendors provide for encoded signatures on applications and some restrict 
applications to a single controlled source, while others have no restrictions 
on the source of an application. Table 1 below, outlines the Apps delivery 
security mechanisms which are put in place by different mobile platforms: 
Table 1 - Outlines the Apps Signing, Revocation, and Approval 
Procedures for Different Mobile App-stores (Source: Veracode1)  
Platform Signing Revocation Approval 
Symbian Signed by  
Vendor 
Yes Quality 
Android Anonymous,  
self-signed 
Yes No 
iOS Signed by  
Vendor 
Yes Policy and  
 Windows  
 
Signed by  
Vendor 
Yes Policy,  
 
  
 
Blackber
ry 
Signed with  
Vendor 
  
 
Yes No 
http://info.veracode.com/Whitepaper-2011 1 
As it can be gathered from the above table, all mobile platforms have 
some sort of App signing mechanism in place. Similarly, it is also 
apparent that all mobile platforms support “revocation” in order to 
remove malicious Apps, once reported or detected. 
 
Page   58  
  
 
2 http://developer.android.com/guide/pub 1 
 
Moving on, 
the mobile 
OS will not 
allow Apps 
that are not 
signed to 
execute with 
an exception 
of the “jail-
broken” or 
“rooted” OS’s which are in fact “jail-broken or rooted” by the users 
specifically to allow unsigned apps to be executed. 
Depending on the implementation of the signing mechanism, it can be a 
great achievement in terms of improved security. For instance, if the 
App is signed by the developer with a self-generated key, there is little 
security gain but if the application is signed by a key issued by the 
platform provider then there will be a security benefit based on the 
policies the platform provider adheres to, for approving Apps. 
Moreover, it is important to stress that the mobile jail-breaking removes 
the security benefits of the platform signing mechanism altogether. 
Android's Market App store for instance, is probably not up to the 
challenge when it comes to malicious Apps publishing and distribution. 
This is evident in the ease with which malicious Apps can be uploaded 
and distributed on the Android Market. 
Fig.1 outlines the process of applications development and publishing on 
the Android Market: Those malicious Apps can access the sensitive OS 
resources such as the text messages, mobile device location via GPS, 
camera, voice recording, to name a few. It can therefore be stated that 
developing, publishing and distributing a powerful fraudulent Android 
App which could steal one’s personal information including their financial 
information is almost trivial as the current security measures deployed 
around the App submission process by Android are inadequate to identify 
and prevent submission of malicious applications to the Android Market. 
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The Apple’s App Store on the other hand, appears to be a “walled garden” 
and it does employ an approval process but the details of its approval 
process are not well documented or publicized. It is therefore difficult to 
establish exactly what sort of details the iOS Security Team at the Apple 
App store takes into consideration, when it comes to an App approval or 
screening. Having said that, it is quite clear, based on the deployment of 
the aforementioned approval process, that the Apple App store is putting a 
lot of effort in ensuring the user experiences and the compliant to its 
policies.  
Fig.2 outlines a procedure of sharing an Apple’s mobile App with tester: 
It is therefore difficult to establish exactly what sort of details the iOS 
Security Team at the Apple App store takes into consideration, when it 
comes to an App approval or screening. Having said that, it is quite clear, 
based on the deployment of the aforementioned approval process, that the 
Apple App store is putting a lot of effort in ensuring the user experiences 
and the compliant to its policies. 
3 http://developer.apple.com/library/ios 1 
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According to a recent report from Symantec7, Apple and Google are very 
different when it comes to mobile security, “creating distinct potential 
vulnerabilities for enterprises embracing devices running these operating 
systems". Apple employs an “Application Provenance” strategy which 
basically involves identifying, certifying and vetting an App before it is 
published on to the Apple App store. For Android Market on the other 
hand, the course of action is completely different as there is no vetting 
process as there are far more self-signed applications and the Apps can be 
uploaded from just about anywhere on the internet. So although these 
user-friendly Apps are continuously getting more and more popular 
amongst the users, these are also bringing new security threats and 
breaches with them. 
One of the proposed solutions could be that the Android apps are not only 
self-signed but are also signed by certified keys issued by the trusted 
authorities. This strategy on its own may not prevent malicious Apps but 
it would certainly assist in deploying a tracing mechanism which would 
allow tracking down the fraudulent App owner/publisher. 
                                                          
7 http://www.networkworld.com/news/2011/062811-symantec-mobile-report.html 
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As far as the malicious/fraudulent App reporting procedures are 
concerned, these differ from each app-store and the most common issue 
is that the reporting procedures are not clearly defined by the App-stores. 
The same goes for the removal/take-down procedures of a malicious 
App. The Google’s Android Market for instance, does have an option to 
report a malicious/fraudulent App on its website, which can be used to 
request Android Market to review and remove an inappropriate App 
from its store but it could become a difficult task for an end user to find 
the “reporting option” on Android Market website. 
Furthermore, there have been a number of instances whereby a malicious 
App was reported but it took a while until that App was taken down by 
the Android Market. Therefore, it can be stated that the process of 
identifying/reporting and removing/take-down a malicious App from the 
Android Market requires serious considerations and perhaps 
improvements as a result of those 
considerations. 
In the case of Nokia’s Ovi Store, there is a revocation process in place for 
malicious Apps. Revocation provides a final sanction to handle 
applications which may pose a threat to the Nokia users, its network or the 
Nokia’s Ovi community as a whole to ensure those malicious Apps do not 
spread any further. Fig.3 outlines an App submission and signing process 
for Nokia’s Symbian: 
Based on the findings of this study, the next section of this paper will aim 
to propose common policies or best practices for Apps management in 
order to improve the security of mobile Apps ecosystem. 
 
5.2 Mobile Applications Management Best Practices for Different App-
Stores 
1.While conducting a security review of the submitted 
http://www.developer.nokia.com/Distribut 1 
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Apps, the App-Stores should consider a number of different known 
threats associated to the mobile Apps. These threats could include 
but are not limited to8: 
• Activity monitoring and data retrieval 
• Unauthorized premium rates dialing and premium rates SMS 
• Mobile banking and mobile payments related frauds (since the 
mobile banking Apps are increasingly being uploaded and 
downloaded) 
• Unauthorized network connectivity 
• UI (Unique Identifier) impersonation 
• Sensitive data leakage 
• Unsafe sensitive data transmission 
2. The App-Stores should increase the user awareness regarding 
malicious Apps and the consequences of downloading such Apps by 
introducing a number of different measures including an informative 
message, clearly visible on the App-Stores’ websites. This should also 
be the case when it comes to the reporting procedures so that a user 
could follow simple steps in order to report malicious Apps to the 
relevant App-Store. 
3. An introduction of a warning message for the Apps developers/authors 
could also be introduced, stating that a malicious App upload will lead to 
their accounts being deleted permanently and possibility of their details 
being passed onto the law enforcement agencies, in case of a criminal 
activity as a result of their App being downloaded by the users. 
4. All App-Stores should look into placing a quality framework in the form 
of a series of standard security tests which could issue health certificates 
for different Apps in order to combat the growing threat of fraudulent 
Apps. 
5. Apps Isolation - A strong security mechanism for ensuring mobile Apps 
access permissions could be introduced by the App-Stores, since it 
would not be sufficient to allow an App access to certain functions as 
the functionality needs to be further restricted by type, by time and 
conditions. 
                                                          
8  http://info.veracode.com/Whitepaper-2011-Mobile.html 
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6. Banking and other Mobile Financial Services related Apps should only 
be allowed to be published by the banks and related financial 
institutions, ensuring their credentials are fully verified prior to 
submission of those Apps. 
7. In order to improve the security, the App-Stores could carry out a pre-
screening of the Apps and could also deploy a continuous monitoring 
procedure to ensure that the Apps which have been upgraded could also 
be screened / monitored. 
8. A comprehensive vetting mechanism for Apps developers/authors could 
be deployed for all app-stores to ensure a successful tracking-down of 
the owner of the App in case of an App turning out to be a malicious 
App. For instance, all Apps publishers must have an account with the 
appropriate app store before they could submit an App to the app-store. 
Also, the app-stores should verify those publishers’ accounts by emails, 
postal addresses, telephone numbers, and also through their credit card 
details. 
All App-Stores should consider deploying some sort of Apps and Apps 
developers/authors reviewing procedures including the review counters, 
which would automatically raise the alarm in case of a negative review. 
Perhaps an Apps auto-suspension procedure could also be deployed in 
case of reaching so many numbers of negative reviews (e.g. 5), until the 
App is investigated by the app-store security team. A serious 
consideration should also be given to monitor how those feedbacks were 
being submitted in order to ensure that the fraudsters could not abuse 
the review process. 
10. An App review rating from one App-Store could also be used by other 
App-Stores through some sort of a shared reviewing mechanism 
implemented jointly by all app-stores. One of the most serious concerns 
here could be that the most users would rate Apps for their actual 
functionality and not for their security aspects. It would therefore be 
important to have two separate categories for the App reviewing 
mechanism, one for security and privacy issues, which could include an 
App asking for excessive privileges at install, and the other for the 
general functionality issues of an App, which could include information 
such as the App worked as it was supposed to, etc. 
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11. A continuous monitoring of the Apps developers/authors in a way that 
the prior Apps contribution should not be taken into account and each 
new submitted App is considered on its own basis. 
12. The malicious Apps reporting procedures should be well defined and 
easily visible (highlighted) and accessible to the users of an App-Store. 
One of the options could be a simple reporting form in order to submit a 
complaint which should be dealt with and resolved, as quickly as 
possible. Another suggestion could be a live chat channel in place on all 
App-Stores so that a user who wishes to report a malicious App could 
do so, as and when needed. 
13. A simple but effective and appropriate, “take-down” or “removal” 
procedure for all different App-Stores could be implemented. Perhaps a 
unified “shared” take-down mechanism could be employed throughout 
different App-Stores in order to ensure the malicious App publisher gets 
barred from all stores. 
14. All App-Stores should have a kill-switch to remotely kill a malicious 
App upon reporting/discovery. A generic policy and procedure on 
“remote wipe” could also be implemented in case of a malicious App 
disaster ensuring that the users are fully aware of those procedures. 
15. All App-Stores should consider priority vetting for updates of existing 
Apps in order to enable the Apps developers/publishers to patch up the 
vulnerabilities quickly and effectively. 
16. A knowledge share mechanism between different App-Stores could be 
deployed in order to report and monitor a fraudulent 
developer’s/author’s activities. 
17. A generic (for all App-Stores), mobile devices Apps downloading and 
user’s best practices could be developed in order to ensure an 
increased awareness for the end users. 
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6. CHAPTER III “nfactor authentication in ebanking environments” 
6.1 Situation 
The blooming of Internet technologies has revolutionized the way people 
transact with their financial institutions. E-banking users have 
considerably benefited from using e-Banking services without time and 
location constraints (‘whenever you want’ and ‘wherever you are’). 
Banking customers can also access their account balances and con- duct 
transactions not only via their personal computers but also via their 
smartphones and tablets. According to a recent survey by Ernst & Young 
[40], excellent online banking experience is one of the main attributes that 
banking customers value most, a fact that is indicative of the convenience, 
simplicity and speed those e-Banking offers. 
 
Nowadays, it is estimated that one in four Internet users access banking 
sites globally [38]. Moreover, given the surge of mobile technology, the 
number of people that use their mo- bile device for e-Banking and e-
financial services has drastically increased over the past years. According 
to Juniper [39], over 590 million mobile users have used their mobile 
devices for banking purposes. 
 
On the other hand, the lack of proper security measures raises concerns 
about financial institutions’ security practices and acts as a barrier for 
the wider adoption of online and mobile banking services [20]. It is 
indicative the fact that security of online payments is the second most 
common concern of European Union’s citizens when using online 
banking ser- vices [41]. By taking advantage of the aforementioned poor 
security practices of online banking systems, cyber-criminals are able to 
conduct fraudulent online transactions that cause money loss to banks 
and their customers. 
 
A recent study by European Commission reveals that 7% of EU Internet 
user- s say that they have been victims of credit card or banking fraud 
online [41]. In addition, the sensitive nature of financial and personal 
information used in online banking may raise privacy issues. If an 
attacker gets access to customers’ data, it can be regarded as a privacy 
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violation from the customer’s perspective while the attacker can also use 
this information for further social engineering attacks. 
 
Given the rapid evolution of cyber-crime, financial institutions should 
move forward. Since the implementation of e- identification and 
authentication methods (eIDAMs) is considered a key aspect in today’s 
e-Banking security, they must be able to provide robust eIDAMs when 
accessing sensitive information and/or performing risky operations. 
Therefore, even though online banking services are slow to adopt cur- 
rent authentication methods [42], risk and cost-benefit analyses should 
be performed and subsequently the most suitable eIDAM(s) should be 
chosen and implemented. 
 
6.2State of the Art 
Cybercrime is increasingly targeting e-Banking systems (‘criminals go 
where the money is’) and at the same time getting more and more 
organized. Nowadays, cybercriminals have the capabilities to target new 
technologies and launch attacks of increased sophistication. Such 
examples are the two high impact attacks during 2012 that shocked the e-
Banking sector. In the High Roller incident [43], 60 million euros were 
stolen while in the Eurograbber attack 36 million Euros were stolen and 
more than 30000 bank customers were targeted [44]. In both incidents, 
attackers were able to hijack two-factor authentication (e.g. mTAN) and 
commit fraud. As a result, e-Banking authentication continues to draw 
important attention to security professionals, and security re- searchers. 
 
Authors in [45] discussed about a wide range of security challenges and 
issues identified in current e-Banking systems. Similar, author in [46] 
and [47] presented an extensive study on e-Banking security and 
introduced a formal definition of e-Banking threats and security models. 
Security threats was also the focus of authors in [48], authors presented 
a study on the main security threats towards proposing the use of 
biometrics for strong authentication in e-Banking scenarios. In a similar 
form, authors in [49], study the security of e-Banking authentication, 
and discuss about biometrics adoption as a second or third authentication 
factor. 
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A taxonomy of attacks to e-Banking authentication was introduced by 
authors of [50], additionally a challenge/response authentication solution 
has been proposed. An assessment of authentication methods for e-
Banking was presented by authors in [51] however; the presented study 
was focused only on the PC-based scenarios. 
Although interesting approaches, the evolution and sophistication of 
Internet and mobile attacks require a continuous study of emerging 
threats, issues and challenges especially design to attack e-Banking 
scenarios. Similar to our study, authors in [52] analyzed the eIDAMs 
used by major banks in English speaking countries; nonetheless, their 
research was limited to data collected by mere observation (publicly 
available), contrary to our approach, which, analyzes these factors, taking 
into account current e-Banking systems with information provided by the 
security professionals of major European banks. 
Finally, our study provides an eIDAMs assessment and a set of 
recommendations taking into account the security professional’s 
perspective. 
 
6.3e-Banking Threats Categorization 
This section identifies the most relevant security threats in e-Banking 
and explains how those threats are related to the authentication process. 
The categorization of threats is based on the asset that is being attacked 
(Figure 1); this approach was firstly introduced by authors in [46]. 
 
A. Threats against end-users 
End-users are often seen as the weakest link when ensuring security. In 
particular, identify theft can be achieved by i) physical observation, ii) 
social engineering or iii) phishing campaigns. 
 
1) Physical observation 
direct observation techniques like shoulder surfing can result in identity 
theft, user’s credentials can be captured or even stolen. 
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2) Social engineering 
through non-technical means, users’ credentials can be com- promised, 
just by having knowledge of personal user details; this can result in user 
impersonation, like claimed identity during registration, phone calls, etc. 
 
3) Phishing 
End-users are often victims of traditional phishing email at- tacks, also 
highly targeted spear-phishing or heterogeneous phishing campaigns 
(e.g. phishing through online social net- works). This attack allows the 
attacker to collect users’ credentials, often by leading end-users to 
phishing sites. 
 
B. Threats against end-users’ devices 
Threats to end-users’ devices are considered those targeting various 
devices like PC, mobile devices, tokens, etc. 
 
1) Device theft 
End-users may be victims of theft of their token or mobile device, or 
even a piece of paper with their passwords writ- ten down; combined 
with other information or attacks, this attack may result in credentials 
theft. 
 
2) Tampering 
Of token or device, PIN brute force or side channel attack- s, hardware 
key-loggers or even replication are some attack examples of this threat. 
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Figure. 1: Threats against e-Banking systems 
3) Malicious software 
Malicious software authors are increasingly targeting electronic banking 
systems. The embedding of malicious code aimed at stealing credentials 
and other sensitive information may take place through different methods. 
Examples of those methods are keyloggers aimed at recording users’ 
credentials and mobile banking Trojans, which, in turn are able to hijack 
two-factor authentication. 
 
C. Threats against communication networks 
Threats targeting the communication channel between end- users and the 
remote banking server. 
 
1) Pharming 
Pharming attacks target the network infrastructure (specifically routers 
and DNS servers) and redirect end-users to illegitimate websites, i.e. 
users are redirected to a malicious URL while having entered the correct 
one in the address bar. Credential theft if possible in a similar form as in 
phishing attacks. 
 
2) Eavesdropping, interception and hijacking 
This threat category includes network-based and server- based man-in-
the-middle attacks. e-Banking credentials, transaction data, OTPs and 
other sensitive information is captured through i) erroneously trusting in 
fake SSL certificates; 
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ii) passive traffic monitoring (sniffing); iii) replay attacks; and iv) active 
man-in-the-middle attacks. 
 
D. Threats against e-Banking services 
These threats target the electronic banking infrastructure that hosts the web 
banking service and the respective data stored. 
 
1) Code injections 
Web code injections against banking servers allow attacker- s to exploit 
vulnerabilities of the web banking services and applications; these attacks 
are performed through different web exploitation techniques, such as 
SQL injections, cross- site scripting, cross-site request forgery, and 
redirection to a malicious URL. These attacks allow information 
collection such as users’ credentials. 
 
 
2) Bank data breach 
Internal or external attacks to banks’ databases allow data breaches of 
sensitive information (e.g. end users’ credentials, account information, 
social security numbers etc.). 
 
6.4e-Banking Authentication 
Authentication is the process that allows an entity to establish the identity 
of another entity. Current eIDAMs are based on: 
i) Something that you know, ii) something that you have, and 
iii) Something that you are. When two or more of those elements are 
combined the process is known as strong or multi- factor authentication. 
Additionally, authentication based on where the user is or what the user 
does is known as context- based authentication and it is commonly used to 
complement strong authentication methods. During the initial stage of this 
research, we have selected the most common and relevant eIDAMs for 
e-Banking. The categorization has been done according to the type of 
element and credentials. A short description of each eIDAM is 
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introduced in the following subsections. 
iv)  
A. Knowledge-based authentication 
Authentication approaches based on what you know usual- ly consist of a 
combination of a valid and unique identifier (username) and a secret pass-
phrase (PIN or password). There exist two important security 
enhancements to this approach namely i) virtual keyboard and ii) partial 
password. The virtual keyboard is a software-based keyboard displayed on 
the screen aimed at preventing keyloggers; while in the partial password 
approach, users are asked to enter only some of the digits or characters 
from the PIN or password, usually partial password is implemented to 
request different position- s for each session. The combination of both 
(virtual keyboard and partial password) provides a higher level of 
protection against keyloggers. 
B. Possession-based authentication 
The two widely adopted authentication approaches based on what you 
have are i) One Time Password and ii) electronic Signature. 
 
1) One Time Password 
One Time Password (OTP) consists in generating a different and 
essentially random password namely OTP, which, is valid for only one 
session or transaction. OTP implementations are basically based on either 
event-based, time-based or challenge-based algorithms. OTP-based 
authentication can be delivered in several forms providing different 
benefits in terms of security, usability and costs, those forms are de- 
scribed below. 
 
• Static OTP: physical documents containing a list of codes (OTPs) to 
be used in each transaction like coordinates cards or TAN code lists. 
 
• Dynamic OTP: the OTP is delivered dynamically activated by the 
transaction, examples of these approaches are i) SMS-based OTP, the 
OTP is sent via an SMS message to the registered phone number; ii) 
hardware token consisting of a physical device generating time or 
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challenge based OTPs; iii) software token consisting of a software 
application installed in users’ device generating time or challenge 
based OTPs, a novel enhancement of this approach is through the use 
of QR-codes. 
 
2) electronic Signature 
In electronic signature (i.e. Public Key Infrastructure - PKI) 
approaches, end-users are authenticated through e- Signatures. The level 
of security and usability of this approach is highly influenced by where 
the user’s private key has been stored. 
 
• Computer stored key: users’ private key is stored in their own PC’s 
hard disk. 
 
• Mobile phone: users’ private key is stored in the mo- bile device, 
either in the SIM card or any other secure element present in the 
device. 
 
• Memory card: users’ private key is stored in a USB or a SD memory 
card namely removable memory storage. 
 
• Crypto card or smart-card: users’ private key is stored in the chip of 
their e-Identity card or specific smart card with cryptographic 
embedded functions 
 
C. Inherence-based authentication 
Authentication based on what you are is based on biometric methods, 
traditionally distinguished by the type of characteristics that they evaluate 
like physiological attributes or behavioral singularities. These section 
overviews the leading biometric techniques commonly used to verify the 
identity individuals. 
 
1) Physiological biometrics 
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Physiological biometrics consists of measurements taken from data 
obtained as part of the human body, leading techniques in this category 
are introduced below. 
 
• Hand geometry: this process extracts features from the hand such as 
shape, appearance, textures, length and perimeters of fingers. 
 
• Fingerprint: identifies the lines convergence points. 
 
• Facial recognition: a process that captures a sequence of images, and 
extracts features from the images ensemble to build the biometric 
template. . 
 
• Iris recognition: identifies the location, shape and size of the random 
patterns in the external iris of the eye. 
 
• Retinal: the retinal systems scan the blood vessels in the back of the 
eye, they are highly accurate and require low storage. 
 
2) Behavioral biometrics 
Behavioral biometrics consist of measurements taken from the user’s 
actions, many of them are indirectly measured from the human body 
such as voice. The leading behavioral techniques are introduced below. 
 
• Keystroke dynamics: is the process of authenticating [56] an 
individual based on the verification of user’s typing pattern. This 
process measures and compares the series of user specific timing 
events also known as “typing signature”. Traditional approaches are 
based on data obtained from conventional keyboards, and determines 
specific metrics, such as, the dwell time and the flight time that are 
ultimately represented as math series. 
 
• Voice recognition: makes a power and spectral analysis of several 
 
Page   74  
  
samples of speech, building a statistical pattern from all of them. 
 
• Handwritten signature: signature verification systems use a 
digitalized version of the signature. Modern sensors are however able 
to additionally measure on each point, pen positions, pressure and 
inclination all in a three-dimensional way [55]. 
 
D. Context-based authentication 
Also referred as continuous authentication, this authentication method 
takes advantage of contextual information and it is recommended as a 
complement to other strong authentication methods. Context-based 
authentication improves the level of confidence of service providers 
regarding the identity of a user, independently of the provided user 
credentials. In most cases it is implemented at the server side and trans- 
parent to the user. The most relevant forms of continuous authentication in 
e-Banking, determine users’ authenticity by analyzing users’ behavior, 
users’ scenario and transactions. 
1) Behaviour authentication 
The behavioral authentication process constantly analyzes contextual 
information that characterizes the user’s interaction with the e-Banking 
system. Implemented approaches strongly depend on the type of 
information available to the e-Banking system. The following validations 
are suggested: 
• Individual behavior pattern: users’ behavior is analyzed in all sessions, 
creating individual patterns. An individual user profile (history) is 
stored in the system and compared (current and historical sessions). 
• Multiple behavior patterns: users’ behavior is analyzed during active 
sessions. Validation is done by comparing user’s pattern against 
several “standard” profiles (e.g. company profile, end user profile, 
investor profile). If users’ behaviors do not match with the profile 
associated to them, it may cause restrictions to certain operations. 
 
2) User scenario authentication 
The scenario authentication correlates unique and contextual (network 
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session) information from a registered user device. Detected patterns are 
compared at every session. In particular device authentication is used to 
reinforce user’s identity. When different device data is detected, a scoring 
is computed and a warning is usually triggered by the continuous 
authentication modules, possibly resulting in communications being 
blocked for a particular device. 
• Platform and device identification: fingerprinting of de- vices and 
platform information are evaluated at every session. The parameters 
considered include: i) device unique characteristics (e.g. MAC 
address); ii) Hardware characteristics (i.e. CPU model, clock speed, 
memory latency, memory size); iii) user key stored in the device; 
v) Platform characteristics (i.e. OS and browser versions). 
• Network session identification: contextual information related to the 
network characteristics are analyzed. In particular validations 
regarding the status of an IP ad- dresses are performed such as white-
listed IP addresses, anonymous proxies or blacklisted IP addresses. 
• Geolocation: IP address geolocation, or other geographical data allows 
the system to evaluate the origin of a transaction and the associated 
risk. Various anomalies can be detected in particular in the cases of 
i) IP ad- dress’ belonging to a high risk country classification; 
ii) Inconsistencies in the geographical distance between operations, and 
iii) short times between sessions from a single source IP address used to 
access several customer accounts. 
 
3) Transaction authentication 
Continuous evaluations based on users’ banking account behavior are 
commonly performed by financial services in or- der to authenticate 
transactions. Tracking users’ overall e- Banking operations and 
transaction history when interacting with the e-Banking service allows 
prevention and detection 
of fraudulent activity by evaluating deviations from the expected 
behavior. This authentication category includes: 
• e-Banking sessions: each user interacts with e-Banking services and 
makes transactions in a unique manner. Parameters such as the time 
of the day to perform operations; the time between operations 
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within a session, and the frequency of accessing the service within a 
time window are evaluated. 
• Destination account: based on users’ transaction history and 
transactions to unknown or blacklisted account numbers, transaction 
may be rejected. 
• Amount in operation(s): based on users’ profile, the amount of a 
single operation or of operations within a period of time is compared 
and evaluated. Operations not compliant with accepted patterns might 
require additional user interaction. 
 
6.5 eIDAMs Evaluation and Selection Criteria 
This section first proposes a classification of operation types in e-Banking 
systems followed by a categorization of targeted e-Banking users. Both 
needed to identify the selection factors required to simplify the 
evaluation of eIDAMs’ suit- ability. 
 
A. Operation types 
e- Banking applications allow users to perform various types of operations. 
This section proposes a classification of those operations according to 
four levels of risk associated to them. This classification partly follows the 
Data Protection Authority’s (DPA) recommendations for data breach 
severity evaluation. 
• Operation type 1: general customer information (not financial), allows 
only read-access and does not provide any substantial insight of 
customer’s financial information. 
• Operation type 2: account information (read only), al- lows only 
read-access to personal and financial data. An attacker having 
knowledge of this information can commit other means of fraud. 
• Operation type 3: safe transfers and e-Payments to registered or 
trusted accounts; it allows payments to trusted destinations, relatively 
simple to undo in case of fake or erroneous requests (e.g. Utility 
payments). 
• Operation type 4: risky transfers to untrusted or unregistered accounts 
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(e.g. transfers to any destination, investment instruments, e-Merchant 
payments, management of personal data). 
 
B. User segments 
Several financial institutions target different types of users, this is 
generally known a user segments. Having a categorization of them 
simplifies the suitability assessment of available eIDAMs, especially in 
terms of costs. This section introduces a generic categorization of user 
segments. Note that not all financial institutions might include all of the 
pro- posed user segments; there exist those institutions aimed at only one 
of these categories. 
• Retail: personal banking or consumer banking, aimed at regular 
customers making low amount transactions. 
• Private: personal banking with special needs, i.e. customers making 
large amount transactions. 
• Corporate or Business: aimed at companies/enterprises. 
• Investor: aimed at users managing investment tools. 
 
C. eIDAMs selection and evaluation factors 
Selection factors used in real-life implementations, i.e. considered by 
security professionals, managers and decision makers in the e-Banking 
sector, are briefly introduced in this section. 
• Security: the strength of eIDAMs in terms of covered risk and 
efficiency to resist potential attacks in relation to the represented risk 
and sophistication. 
• Usability: eIDAM’s quality of being user-friendly and closer to user 
needs (ease of use). 
• Implementation cost: the cost impact of the eIDAM’s implementation 
and maintenance effort. 
• Implementation difficulty: in terms of technical requirements to be fully 
deployed and functional. 
• Adequacy: the quality of being able to meet the needs and 
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expectations of a particular user segment (Section V-B). 
• Average loss and reduction: by means of financial loss per involved 
customer and loss reduction after implementing a specific eIDAM. 
• Security incidents, frequency and reduction: yearly frequency and 
reduction of security incidents including number successful attacks 
per year, regardless the number of customers involved on each of them. 
Additional 
factors that 
are specific 
to 
biometric-
based 
implementa
tions have 
also been 
considered 
in the 
evaluation 
of eIDAMs 
and are 
introduced 
below. 
• Biome
tric permanence: the condition that biometric data should not change 
over time. 
• Biometric reliability and accuracy: a biometric system is only 
considered reliable if the performance rates are acceptable. Two 
conventional metrics used to evaluate biometrics’ performance are i) 
false acceptance rates and ii) false rejection rates. 
 
6.6 eIDAMs Evaluation Analysis 
The categorization of threats, operations, user segments and eIDAMS 
described in Section III, Section IV and Section V respectively, have 
been proposed to support a survey ad- dressed to 160 security 
professionals in the e-financial sector in Europe. The objective of the 
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survey was to identify the eIDAMs that are currently implemented in e-
Banking systems. The evaluation of implemented eIDAMS according to 
the se- lection factors introduced Section V has also been carried out as 
part of the same survey. The survey has been distributed and conducted 
by the European Network Information Security Agency with the 
contribution of the APWG.EU, CaixaBank, Merchant Risk Council, 
SecuRePay, FI-ISAC, ECB, EPC, and the FSUG. 
 
A. Current practices 
Several eIDAMs have been introduced in Section IV; how- ever, only 
those represented in Figure 2 have been widely adopted. Figure 2 shows 
the most implemented eIDAMs associated to the operation types (Section 
V-A); virtual key- board is only a security enhancement of 
username/password approaches, but it was important to highlight the 
number of security professionals implementing such enhancement. As it 
can be observed most banks implement knowledge-based authentication, 
but only for non-risk operations (types 1 and 2), nevertheless, a few of 
them still implement weak eIDAMs for risky operations. In turn, the 
possession-based authentication methods are used by most of them to 
authorize risky operations (type 3 and 4). Note that  
Figure. 2: eIDAMs implementation by European banks for each 
operation type 
Surprisingly, inherence- based authentication (i.e. biometrics) has not 
been implemented yet for e-Banking systems in Europe, Section VIII 
will provide a further discussion regarding the adoption of biometrics in 
e-Banking. Contrary to biometrics, security professionals introduced the 
mobile application-based authentication, which is not an authentication 
method itself but a way to deliver it and a current trend in e-Banking 
systems. It is also important to notice that in most cases security 
professionals that contributed by answering the survey did not make any 
distinction between operation types 1 and 2, in the same way it is difficult 
to make distinction between types 3 and 4. 
 
B. Applicability of identified threats to eIDAMs 
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Table 1 presents the applicability of the identified threats (Section III) in 
the different eIDAMs. It has been assessed taking into account common 
practic
es in e-
Bankin
g, 
recent 
literatu
re [46], 
[51], 
and 
real 
world 
attack 
scenari
os. 
As shown in Table I, most of the identified threats are highly applicable to 
the username/password eIDAM. Moreover, only malicious code (i.e. threat 
B3) and bank data breach (i.e. threat D3) are applicable to all eIDAMs. 
Physical attacks against devices or tokens (i.e. threat B1) are mostly 
applicable to the OTP and e-Signature eIDAM categories. Tempering of 
devices, (i.e. threat B2) applicability depends on the robustness of the 
device. Finally, phishing (i.e. threat A3) apart from being applicable to 
Username/password and TAN code list is also applicable to the OTP 
eIDAM category. 
 
C. Perceived 
strength, usability 
and cost 
Through the 
responses of the 
security 
professionals, we 
have identified quite 
clearly three groups 
of eIDAMs 
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according to its strength, which suggests its suitability for the operation 
types (Section V-A). Figure 3 also confirms the common practice in the 
financial sector of giving priority to usability over other criteria. The 
usability restriction for implementing stronger eIDAMs should be 
avoided through adequate training and awareness of customers, and also 
improving the adoption strategy and the “user experience” through 
adequate developments.  
D. Adequacy of eIDAMs’ selection criteria 
 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the relevance of the different selection 
criteria for implementing eIDAMs for the medium and high strength 
groups of 
operations 
respectively. 
Circled in 
dark gray, are 
the most 
relevant 
criteria for 
each strength 
group, and in 
light gray the 
less 
characteristic 
ones. All 
eIDAMs 
involving the 
use of 
hardware 
tokens are more suitable for corporate, private and investor customer 
segments (Section V-B). Distribution costs and usability (an- other 
device to be carried) drawbacks are less relevant for those customer 
segments, because the number of customers is significantly lower (<1% of 
retail users), and they are more conscious of their transactions risk, thus, 
accepting stronger eIDAMs to be applied. New formats of token devices 
are now emerging and are able to improve usability (e.g. token credit 
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card format). However, the associated costs are even higher, narrowing the 
profil
es of 
the 
custo
mers 
to 
which 
they 
could 
be 
offere
d. 
E. eI
DAMs 
risk 
reduc
tion 
benefits 
Figure 6 shows the summary of the reported “loss”, “loss reduction” per 
user and incident, and “number of incidents” associated to each eIDAM. 
The most frequent eIDAMs have also the higher risk, because they attract 
the interest of criminals to research and develop more sophisticated attack 
pat- terns and tools. One exception is the Challenge OTP, from which the 
reported loss is very high, reflecting that it is used only for the customers 
that perform the most risky operations, but the number of incidents is one 
of the smallest, and so the total loss for threats to this method keeps small. 
The opposite case is the Token (USB, memory card) e-Signature, with 
relatively large number of incidents and very low loss for each, because 
of the difficulty to use the token by other person rather than the owner, 
and because this method is also used for low risk operations. In general, 
the results of the survey show that the lower number of incidents 
corresponds to the less implemented methods; mostly those based on 
mobile handset token OTP or e-Signature. In summary, each financial 
organization has to perform the cost benefit analysis, taking into 
consideration those parameters for their own environment, because their 
number of users and actual costs will influence in the total savings due to 
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each eIDAM. 
 
 
6.7 eIDAMs Continuous Authentication Evaluation Analysis 
The second phase of the survey analysis is aimed at identifying the most 
common continuous authentication methods currently implemented in e-
Banking 
systems in 
Europe. 
Based on the 
security 
professionals’ 
responses, an 
analysis of 
different 
factors are 
discussed 
including 
perceived 
strength; 
operation 
types associated to different continuous authentication methods; their 
adequacy to user segments (Section V-B and selection criteria (Section V) 
priorities that are given to each method. 
 
A. Current practices 
Figure 7 presents the most frequently implemented continuous 
authentication methods as it have been categorized in Section IV-D. As 
shown in Figure 7, transaction authentication systems are widely 
adopted in e-Banking systems. 
 
 
While network and geo-location parameters are also taken into 
account, it can be observed that user profiling and plat- form 
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identification have low implementation rates, the reason might be that 
user profiling and platform identification are the emerging methods. In 
this regard, it is expected that due to the rapid evolvement of mobile 
computing together with the fact that current devices allow us to gather 
more useful information; the implementation rates for these methods 
will severely increase in the coming years. 
 
B. Perceived strength 
Results show that security professionals consider two group- s of 
continuous 
authenticati
on methods 
according 
to their 
strength, 
which 
suggests 
their 
suitability 
for the 
previously 
introduced operation types. Figure 8 shows that there are two well 
defined groups of continuous eIDAMs, based on their implementation 
for safe transfers (left and right of the vertical line). It is also worth to 
mention that, the two eIDAMs with lower perceived strength 
(“blacklisted accounts” and “high risk countries”) are some of the most 
implemented, probably due to their adequacy to all user segments (see 
Figure 9). 
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C. Continuous authentication: adequacy of selection criteria 
Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the relevance of the different selection 
criteria when 
implementing 
continuous 
authentication 
mechanisms in 
both lower and 
higher strength 
groups. The most 
popular selection 
criteria taken into 
consideration to 
implement 
methods from the 
lower strength 
group (Figure9) 
are the following: 
i) efficiency and adequacy to the corporate user segment for methods 
evaluating the total amount in operations; ii) implementation easiness 
for anonymous proxy evaluation; iii) low costs and usability for 
evaluating time between sessions; iv) covered risk by methods 
evaluating the geographical distance between IPs; v) high risk country 
classification is adequate to retail user segments; and, vi) blacklisted 
bank accounts are suitable to private and investor user segments. The 
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most popular selection criteria taken in- to consideration when 
implementing continuous authentication of the higher strength group 
(Figure 10) is explained be- low. Implementation easiness is the 
selection criteria used when implementing time between operations 
(one session) method; adequacy to retail user segment is the main 
reason for implementing white listed IPs, while adequacy to corporate 
user segment and covered risk are the influencing factor for 
implementing blacklisted IPs and platform identification. Time between 
sessions evaluating methods selected due to their adequacy to private 
and investor user segments, and finally the amount filter evaluation 
method is chosen because of its low costs and usability. 
 
6.8 Biometrics Adoption in e-Banking 
Results of the study on eIDAMs adoption for e-Banking in Europe 
have shown that despite the potential security attack- s, the most 
implemented mechanisms continue to be those based on what you 
know (e.g. 
TAN code 
list) and 
what you 
have (e.g. 
OTP-based 
hardware 
token). The 
main 
weakness 
of those 
mechanism
s is their 
inability to 
provide 
non- 
repudiation
, which, is especially needed in the e-Banking ecosystem. The non-
repudiation feature cannot be provided by any method that can be 
either replicable or transferable. Therefore, to cope with this limitation, 
biometric solution s have been strongly suggested in the past. 
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Nevertheless, results of the study have shown that very few banks in 
Europe implement biometrics as authentication method for e- Banking. 
The rationale behind this phenomenon is discussed next. 
 
 
A. Challenges on biometrics adoption 
 
1) Security 
False Acceptance Rates (FARs) that are inherent to biometric 
technologies, must be also properly evaluated. In addition, the proper 
implementation of biometric-based systems in terms of security is 
difficult to achieve. Thus, potential at- tacks to the overall system 
implementation must be carefully addressed. 
 
2) Usability 
False Rejection Rates (FRRs) can hinder the suitability of different 
biometric technologies, user are reluctant to adopt solutions that are not 
able to authenticate them at the first try Usability is therefore a main concern 
and it should be carefully evaluated when selecting appropriate biometric 
technology. 
 
Page   88  
  
 
1) Data leakage 
High associated risks, mainly due to the potential attacks to a 
centralized data base storing biometric data, are non- acceptable by the 
e-Banking sector. Even if the information is encrypted or hashed, due to 
the sensitive nature of biometric information, data is compromised forever 
and cannot be changed (e.g. fingerprint, iris, etc.); therefore, it results in 
both, high risk and great responsibility to be accepted. 
 
2) Law enforcement 
Existing legal issues regarding the storage, use and process of personal 
information are of utmost importance. In Europe, a explicit authorization 
from customers is required, which is a difficult task to be achieved. 
 
3) Privacy concerns 
Strongly related to Law Enforcement, people are unwilling or do not feel 
comfortable with granting permission on the storage of their biometric 
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information. 
 
A. Suitability assessment of biometric techniques 
This section presents an evaluation of the suitability of the leading 
biometric techniques for e-Banking systems; the e- valuation has been 
done according the selection criteria introduced in Section V and 
summarized in Table 2. 
Biometric-based authentication has reached certain level of maturity and 
is considered the future of authentication. It can increase the overall 
security of an e-Banking system, it provides non-repudiation thanks to its 
difficulty to be replicated or forged. It is assumed that it can neither be 
shared, nor distributed, forgotten or lost. Its main advantage is that at 
least theoretically the authenticating individual must be present. 
However, current solutions may only be considered as a second factor or 
part of a multi-factor authentication sys- tem, either because of usability 
or associated costs issues as explained below. 
 
1) Fingerprint 
This technique is one of the most traditional forms of biometry; it 
provides a high level of recognition accuracy and it is relatively easy to 
use. It does not require complex user- system interaction; therefore, 
advantages of this method are its usability in terms of performance and 
ease of use and high user acceptance [53], ultimately resulting in a wider 
adoption of fingerprinting in physical and digital access control systems. 
However, despite the benefits, the adoption of finger- printing in e-
Banking is affected by other usability factor i.e. users requiring an extra 
device (fingerprint scanner) and the overall system implementation costs; 
although, fingerprint s- canners are now considered low cost and small 
sized, delivering specific hardware (scanner) to millions of e-Banking 
customers, may result in a large economic impact, surpassing even the 
losses of a single entity. Fingerprinting techniques could work better to 
the corporate, private and investor user segments (i.e. a smaller 
percentage of customers performing high risk transactions). Nevertheless, 
technology trends have envisioned the integration of biometric scanners 
into modern mobile devices (e.g. iPhone 5 and Samsung Galaxy S5 are 
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now embedding fingerprint scanners), promising a wider adoption of 
biometric authentication at relatively low cost for end service providers. 
 
2) Facial recognition 
Facial recognition has become very popular, it benefits from high user 
acceptance. Biometric data extraction can be easily achieved without the 
need of specific sensors, therefore its implementation can be low cost 
when taking advantage of modern technologies, such as mobile devices 
equipped with embedded cameras. In principle, this technique is suitable 
for all user segments; nonetheless, it is of common knowledge that 
illumination conditions may affect the overall performance, resulting on 
limited usability. 
 
3) Iris recognition 
Iris pattern matching is a highly accurate technique. The in- formation 
richness of the iris makes it one of the most efficient forms of 
biometrics, providing a high level of security. Similar to facial 
recognition, it requires a camera to ac- quire the biometric data (sample 
taken from iris). Iris recognition systems are relatively easy to operate; 
however, different types of noise might impact their performance. 
Captured samples in non-controlled environments might suffer from 
poor image quality (e.g. blur) and illumination reflection-Effective 
systems, such as kiosks, are quite expensive and not suitable for user 
segments of e-Banking scenarios. Alternative to kiosk-based solutions, 
rely on the use of desktop or mobile cameras, resulting in cheaper costs 
but increased difficulty and consequently limited in usability. The impact 
in usability is mostly due to variable user distance to the camera and 
illumination conditions. 
4) Hand geometry 
Hand geometry is a very attractive biometric technique; it provides a 
user-friendly interface and requires low data tem- plate storage. Hand 
geometry is in general terms suitable for verification, hand data can be 
exploited in many forms and has high user acceptance. Its suitability for 
access control is further reinforced by the fact that, hand geometry 
scanners have relatively low costs. However, for e-Banking where 
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millions of users will require a specific device (scanner), the overall costs 
are significantly increased, limiting the suitability to corporate, private and 
investor user segments. 
 
5) Retinal recognition 
Despite their outstanding performance in terms of security, accuracy and 
permanence [54], they are not yet widely deployed. The rationale behind 
this, is due to its limited usability and high costs. Users do not feel 
comfortable mainly due to the light that shines to illuminate the iris vessels; 
moreover, the required high resolution scanners are quite expensive 
resulting in unaffordable costs for the financial sector. 
 
6) Voice recognition 
Voice recognition systems are able to provide authentication in a unique 
and non-intrusive form. They provide high acceptance rate because of the 
high usability [55]. The hard- ware requirements of voice authentication 
represent no bigger costs, since microphones are use to capture the 
biometric data and they are readily available. Moreover, the nature of 
voice recognition makes it suitable for all user segments. On the other 
hand, voice authentication implementations need to take special care of 
the required storage and performance, which, tend to be high. 
Furthermore, voice authentication cannot be considered as a unique 
factor of authentication; similar to other behavioral-based methods, 
during the training phase this method present low accuracy. Additionally 
voice recognition algorithms must be tolerant to noise and should not be 
influenced by variations of the voice produced by sore throat or cold. 
 
7) Keystroke dynamics 
Keystroke dynamics is considered suitable for all user segments and it 
represents almost no costs, since, no especial devices are required. 
Usability and acceptability are considered high because in most cases it 
can be performed transparently to the user. The main drawbacks of this 
technique are its low accuracy and low security level during the training 
phase; therefore, it can not be used neither as first factor, nor as second 
factor authentication. Nevertheless, it is suitable for any continuous 
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authentication system. 
 
8) Handwritten signature 
Handwritten signature is widely deployed and well accepted, although, 
it is also target of many security and forgery attacks. One of its main 
issues is permanence, due to the signature time variability evolving over 
time, the resulting signature is significantly modified. As a result, its 
associated security and accuracy levels are considered to be very low. 
Note that similar to other techniques, handwritten signature requires 
specific hardware, limiting its suitability to corporate, private and 
investor user segments. 
 
6.9 Challenges and Recommendations 
This section summarizes the main challenges identified in our research 
and the proposed recommendations to overcome those challenges. 
 
A. Challenge: Promote adequacy of eIDAMs to context 
 
1) Recommendation 
the strength of the implemented eIDAMs has to be proportional to the 
risk associated to the operations they grant access. 
 
2) Recommendation 
medium- and high-risk operations require “Strong customer 
authentication” i.e. two or multi-factor authentication. In particular, it is 
recommended to avoid the sole use of the “something users know” 
approach. 
 
3) Recommendation 
medium- and high-risk operations require a strategy that includes the 
implementation of at least two eIDAMs either using different channels of 
communication or two different devices. 
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4) Recommendation 
Implementation of continuous authentication eIDAMs may provide 
additional factors, improving security without additional impact on 
usability. 
 
B. Challenge: Improve awareness and behavior of customers and 
professionals 
 
1) Recommendation 
continuous training of professionals and advising customer- s are needed 
activities in order to improve their perception of actual risks; keeping in 
mind the latest threats and attack patterns adopted by criminals and 
associated to eIDAMs and e-Banking transactions. 
 
2) Recommendation 
professionals of financial institutions have to guide their customers in 
order to i) overcome the perceived lack of usability (sometimes in 
appearance) of stronger eIDAMs required by e-Banking systems; and ii) 
increase the comfort and the awareness of customers regarding stronger 
eIDAMs that en- able better protection to their assets. 
 
3) Recommendation 
4) A general statement about implementation of continuous authentication 
eIDAMs should be announced to customers, and it should be done 
according to Personal Data Protection Directive. Recommendation 
technology providers must guarantee secure e-Banking application 
development; taking into consideration current and future threats to 
Operating Systems (e.g. mobile attack vectors) and performing data 
security analysis (persistence and access control). 
 
5) Recommendation 
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Distribution of e-Banking applications has to be done through trusted 
channels and reputable sites that are able to guarantee that applications 
have been tested for security. 
 
C. Challenge: Risk reduction 
 
1) Recommendation 
Financial institutions and e-Commerce merchants must per- form specific 
risk analysis for their environments; taking in- to consideration actual loss, 
number of incidents, number of customers involved and vulnerabilities of 
the available authentication methods. Based on such analysis, choose the 
eIDAMs that effectively reduce the number of incidents and loss. 
 
2) Recommendation 
implementing a context-based authentication strategy can highly 
increase the confidence level and the overall security regarding user 
authentication and consequently reduce the number of incidents and loss. 
 
3) Recommendation 
the concept of “something the user has” can be extended to the IP 
address, device and platform used to access e- Banking services; 
therefore, it is recommended to register users’ device, platform and even 
mobile applications used by customers and verify them in continuous 
authentication eIDAMs. Real time validations of the authenticity of such 
parameters should be required in order to reduce risks. 
 
4) Recommendation 
Static analysis of the security of users’ devices used to access e-Banking 
services should be performed and evaluated directly or indirectly. Result 
of this analysis could be used to trigger the requirement of additional 
eIDAMs. 
 
5) Recommendation 
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eIDAMs to be implemented may include elements linking authentication 
to the specific amount and destination account by providing non-
repudiation, end-users may feel more confident with the transactions they 
authorize. 
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CHAPTER 7: RESULTS & CONCLUSIONS 
In the Malware research in chapter 4th we have showed a complete solution to 
detect certain families of Zeus, one of the most dreadful financial mal-wares. 
In particular, we have exposed a technique that allows to extract the 
keystream used by Zeus to encrypt its payload. Based on these results, an IDS 
to detect Zeus (Cronus) has been detailed, and it has been experimentally 
tested on a production network. Excellent performance and effectiveness 
results achieved by Cronus support our findings. Finally, we have reported on 
lesson learning and highlighted future work. 
As shown in chapter 5th he mobile App-Stores should ensure they take into 
consideration the current security issues, including the known threats and 
vulnerabilities when permitting an App to be published on their stores, in 
order to enhance the overall security of the App delivery management 
mechanism. 
Similarly, the Apps developers, while developing an App, should not only 
consider an App’s functionality and usability but must also take into 
account the security aspects of that specific App. This could include App 
isolation, ensuring that an App must not attempt to access unnecessary 
resources, etc. 
Research shown in chapter 6th presented a thorough study of current 
practices and security challenges associated to the implementation of 
eIDAMs in electronic banking. Based on our analysis, it can be concluded, 
that there is no one-fits-all approach when implementing secure 
identification and authentication. This is a result of the fact that not all 
financial institutions may cover one or more user segments and/or 
operation types; therefore, a different set of requirements is needed by each 
of them, affecting also the selection criteria that must be used. For that 
reason, it is strongly recommended that security professionals perform risk 
and cost-benefit analyses of their e- Banking ecosystem, in order to able to 
better decide on the most suitable eIDAM(s) to be implemented. 
 
Chapter 6th has also identified that due to the rapid evolvement of 
technologies, the emerging trends in the e-Banking security area are now 
focusing on mobile and biometrics based authentication. The combination 
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of both, mobile and biometrics are promising state-of-the-art solutions, 
providing high level of security allowing the evaluation of context 
information by analyzing the users’ behavior and identifying user devices 
and platforms used to access the service. 
Future research directions will provide the design principles and 
experimentation of an authentication system based on biometrics 
deployed in real production environment, which, integrates continuous and 
transaction authentication. The adoption of cloud-based authentication has 
not been discussed in this research, mainly because it is not really 
considered an eIDAM, but a form of implementing it. Nevertheless, 
cloud-based authentication promises reduction of complexity and ease of 
scalability, for this reason it is worth to be explored in future research. 
 
It has been shown that by analyzing Malware samples we can characterize 
their behavior in control devices for accessing online banking services to 
identify customers when they supplant the legitimate user. 
This method can detect not only Family ZEUS malware Trojans, but also 
those families that use a similar system of encryption. This technology has 
been used by different families of malware during the period in which the 
scientific study is done. 
Detection of illegal access by this method has been shown to be efficient 
and has detected several ZEUS malware families, and several waves of 
attacks against the online banking in Caixabank. 
The proposed recommendations for mobile Apps have been effective to 
prevent inappropriate use of unsafe stores like focus of malware infection. 
The methods of two-factor authentication used by European banks as a 
general concept are currently effective in controlling the Zeus malware 
families. Despite the fraud supported by the banking sector in this period 
attributable to this malware without strong authentication methods, using 
dual factor only (pin 1 and pin2, etc.) amounts would certainly be much 
higher if they have not turned the authentication to more strong methods. 
The results obtained through these work helped entities to take decisions on 
what strong methods implement in e-banking to avoid large fraud amounts. 
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Since the greatest amount of fraud have supported those entities that did 
not use double factor the banking industry turned to change and 
implemented authentication with robust methods; while those entities using 
these robust, strong methods (OTP, OTP/SmS, etc.) have been markedly 
less economically disappointed. 
Biometrics techniques used in the scientific study are varied and their 
application as double factor is still controversial. The POC conducted show 
that the technologies used as identification by biometric techniques to 
implement the two-factor required by the ECB still needs to improve the 
algorithms to implement in terms of usability that are better accepted by the 
users (customers). This is particularly suitable in facial identification 
technology. 
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ANNEX 1 SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS  
In the following table are the publications, presentations and proceedings 
issued from the research works related to the thesis: 
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Research works are published in articles that focus Malware and 
cases of use of the Zeus Trojan family, the articles published on 
authentication methods, Malware barriers that must be overcomed 
to reach the money and the work carried out as a review of security 
for mobile platforms (Table 1 below) 
Table 1: Summary of publications  
the proceedings and presentations from Table 2 are directly related 
and part of the body of research. Although they have not been 
published in magazine or publications are important contributions to 
the research  
Table 2: "Proceedings" and conference presentations: 
 
Nomination and statement of previous works and publications related to the 
research: 
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At the beginning of the research in e-crime projects run by me, other works 
were published "benchmarking ip blacklist for financial botnet detection" 
presented at the "Sixth International Conference on Information Assurance 
and Security IAS2010 Conference, Atlanta, USA 2010 Authors D. Gold., J. 
Moon., A. Felguera., M. Vilanova., and J. Serna. The paper "A Framework 
For Financial Botnet Analysis" presented in "The eCrime Researchers 
Summit 2010 (ECRS 2010) Dallas, Texas, authors M. Riccardi., D. Gold., 
J. Moon and M. Cremonini. 
 
These previous studies were performed with mixed teams of Barcelona 
Digital Foundation and my team at Caixabank, with the aim to better 
understand the scientific environment of the called "botnets" systems, 
before entering the research on authentication systems and Malware 
(Trojans) that rely on this type of infrastructure. 
 
The work presented in Texas won the IEEE-SA APWG eCrime fighters 
Scholarship Award. 
These works are not included in the thesis publications list, since I did not 
participate in them as an author but as director of the research project, but I 
nominate its existence because they quote and are important for new 
researchers because are directly related to the research of authentication 
and Malware and because they were developed in the environment research 
projects that I lead and coordinate since 2010. 
 
The research areas field related to e-crime is very broad and there are 
different varied lines of research. My research included financial 
institutions online and major threats, response or defenses that are at the 
cutting edge, whether real and presenting threats to industry bank and its 
customers, (eg The latest financial malware family, the latest version of the 
family of a very active Trojan  Zeus against the bank, types of attacks 
against mobile client systems connecting with the bank, etc. Authentication 
systems, use of biometrics authentication systems, state of the art in mobile 
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applications, research on the safety of the platforms that connect to online 
banking (mobile phones, ipads, tablets, etc.) 
 
Focus in the works and their context, geographically speaking, if anything 
this distinction is possible on the Internet, we have chosen threats affecting 
the environment of banks in Europe, in a European customer, which does 
not mean at all that, could not affect other geographical regions of the 
world to being global threats that do not distinguish borders. That is why 
we have developed several studies on families financially Malware and 
Trojan called Zeus (such as use case Malware), about the safety of mobile 
applications on the systems authentication and security level banks, on use 
of various technologies in the authentication methods in the mobile 
security. APP’s and their developments made to improve the response of 
the security groups (CSIRTS, CERTs), etc. 
 
I have also made a number of works both forensics and electronic research 
in general; the results have not been published due to confidentiality of 
results or the environment in which they are incurred. 
 
Public research carried out in the environment of e-crime begins in 2010. 
My role as director of the research projects in "La Caixa" has always been 
intervening directly deciding the topic, focus and objectives of the research 
and directing research and research funding in all cases. 
In the development of the research I have been directly involved either in 
person and working with my team members as "senior" or in decisions of 
research projects or in the development of the projects themselves. 
Due to interest to us, the financial sector, authentication systems and the 
threat to these systems embodied in malware and field research Trojans, we 
have published works that I have done research tasks directly, I have also 
directed directly as first author all work the research. 
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The research results of the thesis show a progression that includes the work 
of the line intrinsically related to authentication methods and Malware 
research. Each of the research topic and the correspondent publications 
represents a progression or a study of a pending important aspect in the 
earlier work of the follow consistent and research publications. 
 
 
Publication: ECRS-11 Code / IEEE 11 
 
(1) Taming Zeus by leveraging ITS own crypto internals. 
 
The contribution of the first publication of the Zeus malware "Taming Zeus 
by leveraging internals crypto Its Own" can be summarized in the 
following points: 
a) First, the scheme and operation of malware infection is described: The 
following diagram shows the steps from a user is infected until their data is 
captured and sent to a server (C & C) controlled by the owners of the 
botnet Zeus Trojan. 
Explanation of the steps. 
1. The user, or surfing the net or clicking on a link in an email, access to a 
website where it is infected by an "exploit kit" that takes advantage of the 
navigation software vulnerability of the victim to inject malicious code , 
usually a "dropper" (Downloader malware) 
2. The "dropper" is running on the victim machine, connect to a second 
server, and download the banking Trojan, that is prepared for stealing user 
data. 
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3. Once the Trojan has 
been downloaded and 
installed on the victim 
machine, this request to 
download the configuration 
file. The file can be found 
in different locations (in the 
public forums, in a 
compromised server, etc.) 
and is encrypted in this 
case of use, using an 
encryption system based on 
RC4 plus XOR operations. 
This configuration file contains instructions and details of the entities 
affected by this malware. 
4. The user connects to the website financial institution, the malware that is 
monitoring the user activities is activated when the user navigates to the 
website of the bank and has specific instructions to capture data access and 
authorization operations. 
5. The user sends the data, believing that is only sent to the bank, but 
actually is also sent to a server controlled by the criminal infrastructure. If 
the malware needs some updating, its mode of operation will gradually 
time to time communicate with Command & Center of the botnet (C & C) 
to receive updates. 
 
b) Second, the authors propose a general methodology to break the 
encryption communications malware. 
 
c) Third, we provide a proof of concept of this methodology applied in the 
production environment. 
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d) Fourth, we showed that this methodology can be used to respond to the 
threat of Zeus and finally highlighting lessons learned we provided some 
general principles of Malware (in general) and Zeus in particular. 
 
As we perform future works the we will propose a generalization of the 
keystream technique and propose some IDS defense system  
 
Publication: Code CN-13 
 
(2) "revenge Titans: Zeus detecting flaws via Its Own" 
 
This broad line of research work started with the previous work and 
complete the remaining tasks in the research, introducing recommendations 
to counter attack the malware analyzed in the above publication. 
 
The contributions of this publication are: 
a) First, the authors propose a technique to break communications malware 
(keystream) extracting the system used to encrypt such communications. 
 
b) Second, we propose a generalization of the keystream technique  
 
c) Third, we propose Cronus, an IDS that specifically seeks the Zeus 
malware, testing it experimentally in a production network and their skills 
and effectiveness are discussed. 
 
d) Finally we highlight some principles that reside in the malware- and 
Zeus in particular which focus future research in this field. 
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In both works (1) and (2) it should be noted that the version of the Trojan is 
the latest at the time of the malware family with what was the most recent 
of all the papers published so far, so this research It is a novelty 
contribution to the scientific world. 
 
To Perform outstanding work we will make a review of authentication 
systems to prevent the spread and infection by malware and as a means of 
prevention. Make a State of the art of the authentication methods in online 
banking. And a research study of the art mobile apps as a way of malware 
infection. 
 
Publication: Code IEEE12M 
 
(3) "Tasam - Towards the App-Stores smart devices Security Management 
Applications related best practices". 
In this publication a review of the safety of mobile applications is 
performed as downloads Apps are used for financial services such as 
discharge Malware point and hide trojans deceiving customers with social 
engineering techniques, leading to a false application (the Trojan) that 
allows the attacker to obtain credentials and perform fraud to ebanking 
customers. 
 
The publication introduces the following scientific contributions: 
a) First is a review of the main app stores for mobile financial services. 
b) Second, it offers a proposal for these stores and provides a set of best 
practices and recommendations for improving safety management based on 
the review of outstanding work performed: Concept tests on mobile 
platforms, POC authentication methods and authentication methods. Open 
mobile banking. Safety tests on mobile devices. Reinforce the management 
of security and methods on mobile devices. 
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Publication ENISA Code 13 
 
(4) "eIDAS in e-Finance and e-Payment services - Current Practices and 
Recommendations" 
"EIDAS in e-Finance and e-Payment services - Current Practices and 
Recommendations" is a report that summarizes the results of the survey 
elaborated by me and released by ENISA (European Network and 
Information Security Agency) and APWG.eu. The main objective of the 
survey was to gather information about systems eIDAS systems used in e-
finance and e-payment. Analyzes the risk associated with each 
authentication mechanism implemented in the financial sector and 
recommends lines of action and best practices for the major players in this 
sector and gathering the results. 
 
In this research the tasks performed are described for consistent research 
work in developing the wide survey that touches all the various aspects 
related to the use of eIDAS systems; Segments, channels, systems, mode of 
use, place of use, time of use, appliances, software, reliability, usability, 
resulting from their use, economic consequences of its use, ect. We 
perform tasks to assemble a sufficient database of contacts that conduct the 
survey, as well as for publication on the website of ENISA and about 120 
respondents professionals CISO's, CIO's COO's banking sector. 
 
The contributions of "eIDAS in e-Finance and e-Payment services - 
Current Practices and Recommendations" are: 
 
a) First: Collect survey results released by ENISA (European Network and 
Information Security Agency) and APWG.eu. 
 
b) Second: The main objective of the survey was to gather information 
about systems eIDAS systems used in e-finance and e-payment. 
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c) Third: Analyze the risk associated with each authentication mechanism 
implemented in the financial sector and recommends lines of action and 
best practices for the major players in this sector. 
 
Pending jobs to do: identify and plan proof of concept of the 
recommendations made. 
 
Publication IEEE-13 Code 
 
(5) "A professional view on eBanking Authentication: Challenges and 
Recommendations" 
This work is where first introduced the issue of biometrics analyzing the 
reasons why it has not been implemented as a factor of authentication in 
most of the surveyed entities. In "A professional view on eBanking 
Authentication: Challenges and Recommendations" common threats in e-
banking are analyzed as well as the current state of art, analyzing the most 
popular eIDAS systems implemented in Europe. 
Identifies threats and analyzes the latest attack scenarios in the environment 
of e-banking authentication. Analyzes the most common aspects of eIDAS 
recommended for electronic banking and its usefulness to most popular 
threats in terms of related incidents financial losses. Also recommend on 
solutions to consider to choose and implement eIDAS systems against 
threats (phishing, Trojans, etc.) 
 
Since it is based on responses from professionals taking decisions on their 
systems used by banks, and its customers, the authors, j eagle. J. Serna, 
L.A. Fernandez, M. Medina, A. Sfakianakis present a updated vision and a 
very real recommendations on various aspects eIDAS. Regarding the 
previously published work novelty is that this work is based on eIDAS 
systems through responses from professional and not based on mere 
observation of their use on the websites of the companies analyzed. 
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This work received the award for the best publication of congress 9th 
International Conference on Information Assurance and Security (IEEE) in 
Tunisia. 
 
The following scientific contributions are made: 
 
a) First, common threats in e-banking are analyzed as well as the current 
state of art, analyzing the most popular eIDAS, systems implemented in 
Europe, through a survey elaborated by us, launched by ENISA, APWG.eu, 
and FS-ISAC, and answered for security professionals of the financial 
sector in Europe. 
 
b) Second: It identifies threats and analyzes the latest attack scenarios in 
the environment of e-banking authentication. 
 
c) Third: Analyze the most common aspects of eIDAS recommended for 
electronic banking and its useful/usefulness to the most popular threats in 
terms of financial losses. Also it recommends on solutions to consider at 
the moment to choose and implement eIDAS systems. 
 
d) Fourth: Since it is based on responses from the professionals who make 
decisions about the systems used by its banks, (Aguilà J. et al) present a 
very updated vision and a very real recommendations on various aspects 
eIDAS. 
 
e) Fifth: Regarding previously published work to this line of research 
novelty is that this work is based on eIDAS systems through responses 
from professional and not based on mere observation of use in pages web 
of institutions analyzed. 
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Pending jobs to do: identify and plan proof of concept of the 
recommendations made. Propose new models of multimodal identification. 
 
 
Publication: JIAS-14 Code 
 
(6) "An analysis of n-factor Authentication in e-banking Environments 
 
This paper provides an overview of potential threats in the use of electronic 
banking. Analyzes the most common authentication (eIDAMs) methods in 
the European financial sector, giving an overview of its robustness against 
electronic attacks.  
It’s also conducting an analysis of adequacy as operating systems and 
factors like usability and cost efficiency It also introduces the possibility of 
using biometric authentication methods. 
 
This paper presents the first results of proof of concept identification using 
unconventional methods such as biometrics that are introduced. 
 
This publication provides the following contributions: 
 
a) First provides a general situation and the impact of current major threats 
to online banking. 
 
b) Second analyzes the most common methods eIDAMS ; authentication 
methods and electronic identification, implemented in Europe and 
robustness. 
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c) Third presents an analysis of adequacy in terms of efficiency, usability, 
costs, types and operating segments. 
 
d) Includes an analysis of possibilities with biometrics as innovation. 
Propose new models of multimodal identification. POC perform with 
biometrics on mobile. 
 
 
Pending jobs to do: identify and plan more wide proof of concept of the 
recommendations made.  
 
We realized other conference proceedings and presentations: 
 
Presentation World and ID: 
 
(7) "Mobile Banking Authentication: assessing the robustness of 
authentication mechanisms" 
The contributions of "Mobile Banking Authentication: assessing the 
robustness of authentication mechanisms" are: 
 
a) First, analyzes the current threats in mobile banking applications. 
 
b) Second, identifies the most popular authentication mechanisms on 
mobile devices. 
 
c) Third, advises on the robustness of these mechanisms against known 
threats by providing various metrics in terms of occurred incidents  
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d) Fourth, finally, introduces a set of recommendations concerning 
countermeasures that should be considered in any authentication system 
. 
Perform outstanding work: Review of eIDAS on various platforms and 
concept testing. 
 
 
Proceedings ISSE 2013  
 
(8) "eIDAS landscape for ebanking services" 
 
The contribution of the paper presented at ISSE in Brussels "eIDAS 
landscape for ebanking services" is: 
 
a) First, summarizes the results of the survey conducted in collaboration 
with ENISA, and 
 
b) Second: it presents the first recommendations for improving the 
selection methodology of eidas methods. 
 
Pending jobs to do: identify and plan proof of concept of the 
recommendations made. 
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